

EC43  
CHURCHES OF THE THIRD WORLD  
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INTRODUCTION

The title of this course is CHURCHES OF THE THIRD WORLD. I am not entirely happy with the term "third world", but it is the most common designation now for that part of the world, east and south, which is to be distinguished from "the west" and largely the north, that is, the industrialized nations of the "first world" (Europe and North America), and the "second world" (the communist bloc). You will easily think of exceptions and objections to such a categorization, but it is roughly what we think of when the newspapers and the United Nations talk of the "third world": Asia, Africa and Latin America.

But the course is about the Churches of the third world. It is about what Archbishop Temple some years ago, in a famous speech given at his enthronement as the Archbishop of Canterbury, called "the great new fact of our" age. I quote it regularly in the introductory course on mission and ecumenics, but it belongs also inseparably in any introduction to a course on the churches of the third world. I make no apology for repeating it for it highlights the global importance as well as the significance in Christian mission of the rise of what he called the "younger churches" and what we now more often call the "churches of the third world".

This is what William Temple said at Canterbury. The year was 1942, and the clouds of war were rolling over Europe:

"The world," he said, "is learning its helplessness apart from God though not yet is it on any great scale turning to Him for direction or for strength... rather is it towards more intense and fiercer competition, conflict and war between larger and ever larger concentrations of power..."

"But there is another side to the picture. As though in preparation for such a time as this, God has been building up a Christian fellowship which now extends into almost every nation, and binds citizens of them all together in true unity and mutual love. No human agency has planned this. It is the result of the great missionary enterprise of the last hundred and fifty years. Neither the missionaries nor those who sent them out were aiming at the creation of a world-wide fellowship, interpenetrating the nations, bridging the gulfs between them, and supplying the promise of a check to their rivalries. The aim for nearly the whole period was to preach the gospel to as many individuals as could be reached so that those who were won to discipleship should be put in the way of eternal salvation. Almost incidentally the great world fellowship has arisen; it is the great new fact of our era..."

(The Church Looks Forward, p.1-3)

EC 43  
3rd World Church

What makes it a new fact is that the spreading growth and vitality of the churches of the third world have in the 20th century for the first time in 2,000 years made Christianity a truly universal faith. For the first time in history there is now no single nation in the world without at least a handful of Christians in it. There are still a few small countries which have never had an organized church. And there are some larger ones like North Korea which once had a church in every city but where <sup>today, when we know</sup> now not one single organized church remains, so far as we know. But only two countries in the world, according to the World Christian Encyclopedia (pp. 800f.) have no organized church, and in both countries there are isolated, perhaps hidden Christians. Those two are North Korea (pop. 18 million) and Mongolia (pop. 1 million). Some would now add Albania (pop. almost 3 million).

At the end of World War II, in 1945, <sup>the vast bulk of</sup> two-thirds of all Korea's Christians were in the north. Today there is no record of an organized, recognized church there, though one may soon be allowed <sup>to exist</sup>. Mongolia was entered by Roman Catholic missionaries in the 13th century, 600 years ago, and by Nestorian missionaries even before that, but when the Protestant missionary James Gilmour entered Mongolia in 1871 he could find no believers there, and when he left 21 years later after incredible hardships and heroic labors there were still no Mongolian Christians. He had worked for 21 years without a single baptism. (p. 495). As for Albania, the Eastern Orthodox Church seems to have survived the oppressions of the world's cruelest communist regime, but is under harsh and rigid control. There are no Protestants to report, though for a short while a Baptist pastor managed to gather a group of about 20 converts together. The last three Roman Catholic bishops disappeared without a trace in 1977. (p. 135).

All the other countries of the world, <sup>indeed, more or less</sup> however, have an organized church. The church at last has circled the globe and however inadequately has "proclaimed the gospel to every nation". We shall later have to take another look at that. The Bible doesn't quite say "every nation". What Jesus commanded it to do in the Great Commission was "make disciples of panta ta ethne" (πάντα τὰ ἔθνη) which could be more accurately translated "make disciples of every ethnic group" which is quite different and should rid us of the comfortable notion that the church's global task of evangelism, to say nothing of its broader responsibilities, is still unfinished. India, for example, is one nation, but it has 3000 ethnic groups. (McGavran, Ethnic Realities, p. 18)

What Is the Third World? ~~But~~ Before we look more closely at the churches, let me return for a moment to the question with which we started. What is the "third world"? I said I wasn't too happy with the term. Why? Primarily because it doesn't quite fit. I am going to use it because the alternatives are even more awkward. "Two-thirds world"? That's what some people call it, and if you think only in numbers it's reasonably accurate. But it's clumsy, and the world is made up of more than numbers. "Lafricasia"? That's even clumsier, although a great missiologist, Donald McGavran likes to use it, and it does at least describe what we usually mean: Latin America, Africa and Asia, as the "third world". So for want of a better term, I will use "third world",



remembering that "third" in the dictionary doesn't necessary mean less than first or second, or not as important as first and second. One of the dictionary meanings of "third" is simply "one of three", and that is how I will use it.

So what is this "third world"? Ten years ago or more when the term "third world" was fairly new and becoming increasingly popular, the news magazine U.S. News and World Report (March 31, 1975) tried to explain to its readers what "third world" really means. It listed seven characteristics which make the "third world" what it is, and those seven are worth repeating. The article said that 1) the "third world" is not an organization; 2) in numbers of people it is a majority of the world's population; 3) it is economically poor; 4) it is emotionally convinced that it has been cheated by the rich; 5) geographically, in general it is the southern half of the earth; 6) racially, it is the darker-skinned peoples of the world; and 7) politically, it tries hard and rather unsuccessfully to be neutral in the worldwide power struggle that divides the first world from the second world, the democracies from the communists. Let me elaborate a little on these seven points, which are more true than false but never altogether true nor altogether false.

1. Is the third world unorganized? Yes. There is no overall alliance of third world nations. Their only global forum of international communication is the United Nations, which is why the UN is very precious to them, and why so many are desperately dismayed by its decline. Did you see in this week's papers that the Gen. Secretary of the UN, Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar of Peru, was so pessimistic about the UN's future that like Winston Churchill who declared he was not about to preside over the dissolution of the British Empire, he (Perez de Cuellar) said "I don't see any reason why I should preside over the collapse of [the United Nations]. I don't have to die with my ship". To the big nations the UN seems unrealistically in the control of little nations without power; and to the little nations, the UN doesn't seem to be able to help them when they most need help, as Mrs. Aquino quite rightly and pointedly noted yesterday. But where would the third world have a world forum for its views without the UN? It's their only structure with a global voice.

2. Is the third world the world of the majority? Yes. It really is the "two-thirds world" in numbers of people. If you doubt that, look at the population of the continents. The third world's Asia has 60% of all the people in the world; the first world's North America has only 6%. It is the population factor that is the third world's only realistic claim to global power. It is what enables it to dominate discussion in the UN, much to the annoyance of the first and second worlds. But population has only a fragile hold on power. Population is as much a minus as a plus in today's tragically overpopulated world.

3.  
On 23 Sept 1975  
arrives (Sept. 23, '85)  
entirely the 3rd world  
accord to roughly 3rd  
the world's PD.

But for the time being, and at least in the first segment of this course, I want to think of the ~~third~~ world, and world ~~as nations~~ in ~~three~~ the third-world segment of it, in terms of three categories: ① Color, ② Nation and ③ Development.

The UN (and World Christian Encyclopedia) analyzes the

nations in two different ways -

- ① ~~First~~ by color in 5 major groups (white, black, brown, tan + yellow). This is popular anthropology, not scientific anthropology.
- ② ~~First~~ by political alignment in three groups:

- 1. Western world - the so-called "first world" 35 countries.
- 2. Communist world - the so-called "second world" 30 countries
- 3. The third world - "the so-called "non-aligned nations": 158 countries.

③ ~~Second~~ <sup>Third</sup> by development.

- 1. More developed regions - 51 countries
- 2. less developed regions 172 countries

~~If we measure the spread of Christianity in these differing classifications, as of 1980:-~~

~~The western world's 35 countries had 35% of the world's Christians (547 m.)~~  
~~The Communist world's 30 countries had 18% of the world's Christians (259 m.)~~  
~~But the third world's 158 countries had 47% of the world's Christians (631 m.)~~

I. look at it first by color - which is how most of the world still judges people. Who said Christianity was a white man's religion? They say,

that ~~this~~ <sup>in</sup> year 1981/82 for the first time ~~since the~~ <sup>since in 1200 years</sup> ~~in history~~ the majority of the world's Christians have darker skin (black, brown, <sup>tan</sup> ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> yellow - whatever you want to call the colors) - and white Christians are now, and probably

Think for a moment about what this means for the world Christian mission in our time. Here are some brief thoughts.

1. The old <sup>(spiritually & materially)</sup> power base of Christian missions is eroding. Christianity from the time of the Reformation (1500) to the 20<sup>th</sup> c. (1900) was exactly what the third-world sometimes still calls it - a "white man's religion".

2. But it isn't <sup>a white religion</sup> any longer. As of this year ~~it is~~ its colour is darker than white.

4. This probably means a shift in the base of mission from the west to the third-world if Christians are going to carry out ~~the~~ the Biblical mandate of reaching the whole world with ~~a~~ a clear, effective presentation of the ~~of~~ love and claims of Jesus Christ.

3. The power base of missions will probably shift to the ~~fastest growing~~ peoples who are turning faster to find Jesus Christ as lord of Saviour than others - ~~to~~ <sup>the</sup> black, yellow and brown races of this world.

5. Therefore, in any planning for the future of the Christian Church and its world mission, it is absolutely imperative that the 3<sup>rd</sup> world churches become an indispensable part of the planning and operation ~~for~~ in the ~~Christian world mission~~ Christian world mission.



that ~~we take~~ the third-world churches ~~not~~ become an indispensable part of ~~our~~ the planning and operation.

Western planning for world mission, if it is done in isolation from the churches of the third world, is obsolete. Nothing but cooperative world planning for world Christian mission will do in today's world. We live in a new situation.

II. But color, as we know, is a very imperfect, highly stylized criterion for dividing the world's population into categories - though it is still one of the most prevalent. Another but widely used category is political. We divide up the world's population by countries. Here too we find a startling change: - In Carey's day

If we measure the spread of Christianity politically by blocs of countries, as of 1980,

The Western world's 35 countries had	38%	of the world's pop.	(547 m.)
The communist world's 30 countries had	18%	" " " "	(254 m.)
The third world's 158 countries had	44%	" " " "	(631 m.)

- World by Enc. - p. 4. Table 2

The Encyclopedia (p. 3), reporting on this distribution of the world by countries, goes on to say that,

"In 2/3 of the world's 223 countries, Christians now form the majority (over 50%); in one-third [of the world's countries they are still a] minority. This spread is very uneven though (see Global Map 1). Christians number ~~under~~ over 90% in 100 countries; less than 10% in 51 countries; less than 1% in 24 countries, and less than 1/10 of 1% in 6 countries: Afghanistan, Bhutan, Nepal, Somalia, North Yemen and South Yemen. (p. 3).

I note that Nepal is classified as 1/10 of 1% Christian, but these figures are as of a few years ago. Today thanks to the low-key but amazingly effective witness of the United Mission to Nepal, in just the last three or four years, I think that Nepal, though still in the class of regions where public evangelism is absolutely forbidden, has become at least more than 1% (not 1/10 of 1%) Christian.

2/5/85

Intro

B. Introduction to the Third World Churches.

But it is the 3rd world churches which is the primary subject of this course. So before we turn to continental surveys of African, Latin American and Asian Christianity, let me make some preliminary observations about the situation of the churches in the third world.

→ The first fact to consider

First, ~~how does the church compare~~ the Christian church is extremely unevenly distributed in the third world. Its percentage of the population, <sup>(counting total Xn adherents)</sup> in the ~~the~~ three third-world continents ranges from

	Xns.	Pop.
① 93.8% in Latin America	(348,658,000)	371,640,000
④ 44.2% in Africa	(203,491,000)	460,857,000
⑥ 5.1% in Asia	(128,078,000)	2,514,550,000
[②] 86.4% in Oceania	(20,299,000)	23,482,000

In other words, comparing Asia and Latin America the situation is practically mirror-reversed: Latin America about 95% nominal Christian; Asia about 95% nominal non-Christian - with Africa half-way between.

By way of comparison, perhaps I should add 1<sup>st</sup> + 2<sup>nd</sup> world figures. -

② 85.3% in North America	(219,833,000)	248,837,000
③ 85.4% in Europe	(465,601,000)	486,436,000
⑤ 36.1% in USSR	(96,727,000)	268,115,000



If we exclude largely Christian (<sup>statistically</sup> ~~technically~~ Christian) Latin America, and examine Asia and Africa a little more closely as to the religious situation on those two continents, it is better perhaps to divide them into three sections: Africa, South Asia and East Asia.

Africa is almost evenly divided between Christians and Muslims, with Christians recently having a slight edge. Before 1970 Muslims had been in the majority. But in 1980 the statistics were

Christians	203 million (203,490,000)	- 44.2%	of Africa's population
Muslims	190 million (189,728,000)	- 41.2%	" "
Tribal religions	64 million (63,872,000)	- 13.9%	" "

(World Kn. Enc., p. 782)

Moving east ~~into~~ across the Red Sea & Indian ocean into Asia, beginning with South Asia (which includes the Asian Middle East), the largest religious grouping is Hindu, with Muslims second. <sup>Buddhist + kn a fairly pm 3<sup>rd</sup> & 4<sup>th</sup> but rather clergypolks.</sup> In 1980 -

Hindus	515 million (515,368,000)	- 41.2%
Muslims	405 million (405,286,000)	- 32.4%
Buddhists	138 " (134,568,000)	- 9.4%
Christians	109 " (109,051,000)	- 7.6%

East Asia, again, is very different. In 1980, by far the largest grouping called itself "non-religious".

Non-religious	550 million (549,340,000)	- 50.5%
Chinese folk-rel.	190 " (189,670,000)	- 15.3%
Buddhists	138 " (137,857,000)	- 12.7%
Atheists	113 " (112,653,000)	- 10.4%

New Religions	34 million (34,241,000)	3.2%
Muslims	22 million (21,491,000)	2.0%
Shamanists	<del>13 million (13,088,000)</del>	<del>1.2%</del>
Christians	19 million (19,026,000)	1.8%
Shamanists	13 " (13,088,000)	1.2%

Confucian	0.5
Shinto	0.3

Population 1980.

Africa	461 million
[ S. Asia	1,427 million
S. Asia	1,087 million ]
Asia	2,514 million
Europe	486 million
L. America	372 million
USSR	268 million
N. America	249 million
Oceania	24 million

(p. 780) (18.4 m. in Austr/NZ; 5 m. in the islands)

Third World's Largest Protestant Churches. (Barrett, 1982)

		Admits	Adherents	1951	1982
AS	1. CHURCH OF CHRIST ZAIRE	④ 1,519,499	4,728,280.		
LA	2. ASSEMBLIES OF GOD, BRAZIL	① 2,783,000	4,000,000	18	2
AS	3. PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENT CHURCH (AGLIPAY)	③ 1,860,000	3,500,000	1	1
AF	4. KIMBANGUIST CHURCH, ZAIRE	② 2,000,000	3,500,000		
AF	5. ANGLICAN CHURCH NIGERIA	359,969	2,941,000	10	6
AS	6. <small>Dutch Ref. Church of S. Africa (Federal Council)</small> PROTESTANT (REF.) CHURCH, INDONESIA	⑤ 987,000	2,142,000 1,958,710		[?]
AF	7. NIGERIA FELLOWSHIP of CHURCHES of CHRIST (SUM)	100,553	1,746,000		
AS	8. CHURCH of SOUTH INDIA	⑨ 515,700	1,555,902	2	4
AS	9. CHURCH OF CHRIST, MANALISTA (PHILIPPINES)	⑫ 400,000	1,500,000		
AF	10. ANGLICAN CHURCH, UGANDA	306,355	1,383,951	12	12
AS	11. PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN KOREA, HAPDONG	200,000	1,298,295		
AF	12. ANGLICAN CHURCH, SOUTH AFRICA	327,436	1,235,946		16
AF	13. DUTCH REFORMED CHURCH, SOUTH AFRICA (WHITE)	⑥ 799,876	1,200,000		
AS	14. COUNCIL of BAPTIST CHURCHES in N.E. INDIA	230,200	1,064,990	4	10
LA	15. BAPTIST CONVENTION OF BRAZIL	350,294	1,050,000	20	12
AS	16. BATAK CHRISTIAN PROTESTANT CHURCH, INDONESIA	⑩ 465,457	1,044,382	5	5
AS	17. PENTECOSTAL CHURCHES of INDONESIA	⑦ 750,000	1,000,000		
LA	18. CONGREGATIONS CRISTA, BRAZIL for CHRIST	⑧ 600,000	1,000,000		9
AS	19. PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH OF KOREA, TONGHAP	253,600	1,000,000		15
LA	20. EVANGELICAL PENTECOSTALS, BRAZIL FOR CHRIST	250,000	1,000,000		
AF	21. SOUTH AFRICAN METHODIST CHURCH	373,635	942,545		
AS	22. METHODIST CHURCH IN SOUTH ASIA	⑪ 421,109	901,306	7	14
AF	23. MADAGASCAR CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST	250,000	881,487		
AS	24. BURMA BAPTIST CONVENTION	248,966	798,560	8	13
AS	25. UNITED EV. LUTHERAN CHS. IN INDIA	339,690	790,440	1	-
AF	26. CHURCH of CENTRAL AFRICA, PRESBYTERIAN (MALAWI)	282,171	766,000	11	7

	Presb	5
Africa	Pent	4
ASIA	Ang	4
LA	Bap	3
	United	3
	Indep	3
	Luth	2
	Meth	2



shrunk quickly and peacefully. And there are few signs yet that Russia's Communists have lost their will to rule.

The odds are that one or both gambles will fail. If so, Mr Gorbachev will be out. The main risk is that his careful compromises will be swept aside by new disciplinarians in the Kremlin. Theirs would be an appallingly difficult restoration. The sheer scale of change in Eastern Europe would make it

hard for a post-Gorbachev fist-banger to restore control there, were he to try. And even inside the Soviet Union, some errant republics—particularly Moldavia and Azerbaijan, with ethnic ties across Soviet borders—might still choose to make a fight of it.

The Soviet Union is at a turning-point. Whichever way it lurches, years of pain and instability lie ahead.

## Ten billion mouths

Slowly but profoundly, demography is changing the ways of the world


**J**UST as Maynard Keynes observed, the great events of history are often due to slow changes in demography, hardly noticed at the time. The second half of this century has seen an astonishing acceleration in the world's population growth—followed by an equally astonishing fall in fertility. The first makes it virtually certain that human numbers, now around 5.1 billion, will reach 8 billion by 2025, and double by the end of the next century. The second makes it possible—no more—that this increase will then give way to stability.

What kind of world will this be? Blacker and browner, for sure (see pages 19-22). Today's developed countries, including Japan, the Soviet Union and all of Europe, are home to roughly a quarter of mankind; by 2025 they will have barely one person in six. By then the combined populations of North America, Europe, Oceania, Japan and the Soviet Union will be outnumbered by Africa's. And India will be overtaking China as the world's most populous nation. Some places will see their numbers as a strength. For countries fighting foot-slogging wars (eg, Iran v Iraq), babies are soldiers-in-waiting. But numbers will not guarantee military muscle. The baby-burgeoning countries will increasingly be the poorest, preoccupied with the struggle for food and jobs.

On paper, the world can feed double its present mouths; but only on paper. Some of the most heavily populated countries have least ability to grow more food. Cereal farmers may rejoice that there will be 3 billion more customers for their grains by 2025. But customers in Bangladesh, say, or Kenya are unlikely to be able to pay their bills. Within the third world, countries that are good at organising their finances and their industries tend to be good at contraception, too; they will get richer while the badly organised continue to get babies. In 50 years' time income gaps within today's third world may be as large as those that now exist between rich nations and poor. Countries like South Korea—poorer than Ghana at the end of the second world war—will have as little sympathy as *nouveaux riches* the world over feel for those too feckless to better themselves.

### Old and rich or young and jobless

Fast population growth in poor countries may often be a powerful cause of unrest. Crimes in rich countries are mainly the work of teenaged boys. Lots of babies means, 15 years on, lots of underemployed youngsters, better educated than their parents but with less chance of a job or a plot of land. They will



look longingly at the job vacancies in the rich world. For with only a handful of exceptions (the Soviet Union, Poland, Ireland) the number of children that rich-world women are likely to have is now too low to maintain the population. Italy has almost overtaken West Germany on the way down: indeed, around Milan, present births indicate that women will have an average of 1.1 children in a lifetime. This fall in fertility will have lasting effects. Just as rapid population growth boosts the numbers of young mothers and guarantees lots of future babies, so it is hard, once a population starts to age, to reverse the trend.

Already, employers in rich countries are queueing at school gates for a shrinking supply of youngsters. If the workforces of the industrial countries no longer expand, all economic growth will have to come from higher productivity—either through technical ingenuity or investment. That will force employers to hunt as never before for ways to raise productivity in the labour-rich service industries. It will put a premium on education: no country will be able to afford to waste labour on unskilled unemployment. And it will improve the position of women. Even the Japanese will find that they cannot afford to waste half their person-power.

Equally important, though, will be the effects on world trade. Immigration would be an obvious way to fill vacancies in rich countries and put money in the pockets of the poor, but immigration will get tougher, not easier. Instead, companies that need lots of labour will face a choice: invent a way of doing without, or move to the third world. There, they will find a labour force made cheap and pliable by sheer numbers. The poor countries that do best will be those that welcome such investment; the companies that succeed will be those that learn to manage third-world workers. The prototype may be Hongkong, whose manufacturers employ more people in China than in the colony itself.

Quite early in the next century, countries now labelled "third-world" will themselves be aging fast. By 2020 the median age of Mexico's population will be 33.4 years (Europe's now is 33.9), and a third of the citizens of Singapore will be 55 or older. More dramatic still, China in 2025 will have as big a share of over-60s as Europe in 2010. Some poor countries will soon be aging faster than the West, but with little state welfare to replace lost traditions of families caring for the old. They have perhaps two generations to build up the national income to look after granny.



The industrial countries are already the oldest nations the world has ever known. They will get older yet. The flip side of the baby boom is the grey glut. On present trends a fifth of Americans, and a quarter of West Germans, will be 65 or over by the middle of the next century. A stable world population

implies, in time, such figures for every country from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe. The birth dearth, that preoccupation of the West in the 1930s, will once again raise the question: are such elderly societies preferable to yet more babies? Many countries may come to doubt it.

## Homework for Bush

While other countries are dominating the headlines, America can do itself good by sorting out its domestic troubles

**E**XACTLY one year into the Bush presidency, Americans feel the world's attention shifting away from them. Mikhail Gorbachev, not Ronald Reagan, is named man of the decade by *Time* magazine. The biggest foreign deployment of American troops since Vietnam is quickly overshadowed by revolution in Romania. Europe's future is avidly discussed by Europeans, east and west, with barely a nod in the direction of Washington. America watches, under a vision-free president elected to do (more kindly and gently) the same things as his predecessor.

No news may be good news, but that has not stopped Mr George Bush attracting some of the blame for America's new mistiness. For the first half of last year, his critics found the reason in Mr Bush's curious passivity towards foreign policy. Elected as the man "ready to be president on day one", he spent five months waiting for an obsolescent strategic review to tell him what he could expect from Mr Gorbachev. He learnt from that hiatus, so used the next six months to confound his critics. He grabbed the initiative with a plan for conventional-arms control in Europe; he welcomed *perestroika*; he sprang a summit on the world; he invaded Panama. In doing so, he disposed of the epithet "wimp" as firmly as he laid to rest the charge that he was fiddling while communism crumbled. His popularity rocked along—Mr Jim Baker's term—at more than 70% in the polls.

Yet still the feeling persists that America is a spectator at the ringside of world events. To some extent this is inevitable: most of the events are happening elsewhere. But Mr Bush can do something about it. If the 1980s taught anything, it is that even a superpower's influence abroad depends on its self-confidence at home. Hamstrung by its twin deficits, America can offer only derisory amounts of aid to Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union or even new democracies in its own hemisphere. Mr Bush will not be more influential abroad until he solves some problems at home, starting with those deficits. However tempting foreign policy now seems—and 1990 will probably have a full menu of summits and treaties—he would do well to take the opportunity of his first state of the union speech on January 31st to show the boldness on domestic issues that has paid off in foreign affairs.

The temptation to travel is certainly great. Mr Bush has been out of Washington for 132 days of the first 365 he has been in office. When not abroad or on energetic holidays, he hops about the country lending a hand to Republican candidates in forthcoming elections: this week he was in Florida to help the governor's effort to get re-elected. After campaigning

for president on and off for 15 years, it must be hard to stop. And since he has won fewer congressional roll-call votes than any previous postwar president in his first year save Gerald Ford, his increasing neglect of Congress is understandable.

Understandable, but foolish. Mr Bush began his presidency with plenty of bipartisan goodwill on Capitol Hill and promptly won that rare prize, an early deal to tackle the budget deficit. He lost much of that goodwill—and the deal—partly through the intransigence of both sides over cutting the capital-gains-tax rate and partly by frittering away his energy on things like a constitutional amendment to ban flag-burning. This convinced many Democrats that he was not serious about reducing the budget deficit. They are now saying there will be no early budget deal in 1990. Mr Bush still regards the cut in capital-gains tax as a main domestic goal for 1990. Add to that a new congressional enthusiasm for reducing the regressive payroll tax (see page 24), and the budget deficit looks tougher than ever.

### Congress can be unblocked

Cast in the role of consolidator of the Reagan revolution, Mr Bush has been cautious about new legislation. He proposes little and opposes much, giving ground only when under pressure, as he grudgingly did on the raising of the minimum wage. He has spent the first year of his administration cleaning up his predecessor's messes (in the savings and loans industry and the Housing Department), resisting social-welfare legislation proposed by Congress, avoiding intractable issues such as health altogether, exhorting people on drugs, crime and education, and occasionally proposing a new idea with a flourish, only to admit there is no money to back it up (education, a trip to Mars).


True, the Democrats control Congress. But for an example of how to handle Congress, Mr Bush need look no further than his own clean-air proposals, which promptly broke a decade-long stalemate between powerful congressional interests. A bill much like Mr Bush's is emerging, with bipartisan support, from the House of Representatives. Mr Bush has no need to be afraid of Congress. He can afford to put some of his considerable political capital (his approval rating passed 80% in the polls after Mr Noriega's capture) behind domestic initiatives. Education reform, a fresh approach to drugs and crime, a balanced budget: these are the things that would revive the world's interest in America, not a president who spends his time avoiding domestic entanglements.





# WORLD POPULATION

87 million in 1988



## Squeezing in the next five billion

**The population explosion is over, say bold demographers. Maybe, but the world's numbers will still double before they stop growing**

**I**N THE second half of the 1960s a remarkable thing happened. After millennia of creeping upwards, and a quarter-century of hectic dash, the rate of growth of world population began to slow down. Since then, some developing countries have seen the speediest falls in fertility ever known.

Only since the second world war has population growth in the poor countries overtaken that in the rich. The 1960s saw their population growth peak at 2.4% a year. Even now, annual growth in the third world is running at 2%—double Europe's mid-century peak. In 37 countries (22 of them in Africa and ten more in the Arab Middle East) the population is still increasing by more than 3% a year.

Though the rate of growth is falling, the numbers being added each year—87m—are unprecedented and still rising: the annual increase will reach 90m a year in the late 1990s, before starting a long decline. Yet the crest of the wave is passing. The transition that took a century to achieve in the West has come about in a generation in some developing countries. Third-world fertility has dropped further and faster than anybody foresaw 20 years ago.

Except in Africa and much of the Middle East, birth rates are now declining in every country. The most dramatic and significant fall has been in China, whose birth rate

has more than halved since 1965. Since China is home to one-third of the developing world's people, that decline alone accounts for much of the change in prospects.

### What happens next?

Death matters as much to demographers as birth—indeed more. As public health improves, deaths decline, mainly because more babies live to grow up. So a country's population becomes more youthful. More young adults means more births. Only after a spurt in total numbers do parents begin to limit their families. Eventually, the birth rate may fall till population stabilises.

In the rich countries this transition took place slowly. Life expectancy crept up, as real wages, living conditions, public health and medical care improved. In poor countries antibiotics and immunisation have helped many more babies to survive; infant mortality is now as low as it was quite recently in rich countries, and life expectancy has risen accordingly. In the early 1950s life expectancy at birth was over 70 years in only five countries, all in northern Europe. Now the list includes Costa Rica, Chile and Singapore. Already life expectancy in Mexico is 66 years—as high as in France in 1950.

This fall in infant mortality means that, even if every mother decided tomorrow to have no more than two children, the world's

numbers would continue to grow. In many developing countries, the number of young women now reaching child-bearing age is larger than ever before. So the number of babies will go on rising long after birth rates have started to fall. In Brazil, for example, the fertility rate—the number of babies the average woman will have in her life, given her society's contemporary pattern of child-bearing—has dropped by 30% since 1965; yet the birth rate—yearly births per 1,000 people—has dropped by only 19%. The total of births each year has risen from 3m in the late 1950s to 3.7m now.

So population will go on rising. But the sooner the world's fertility falls to replacement rate (ie, just above 2) the lower the figure at which the numbers may eventually level off. At what figure, when? The United Nations offers a range of projections. The medium variant assumes that the world will reach replacement fertility by 2035. If so, its population will stabilise toward the end of the twenty-first century at 10.2 billion—double today's numbers. A 20-year delay in reaching replacement fertility would mean an eventual population 2.8 billion higher; replacement fertility by 2015 would cut the final number by 2.2 billion. The difference between these two extremes—5 billion—is the world's present population.

There are some grounds for optimism:

- The number of children women want is lower than ever, and the younger the women, the fewer they want. Many countries show signs of a large unmet demand for contraception. A survey of married women found that 46% in Peru had not wanted their latest child; 37% in South Korea; 34% in Sri Lanka. Modern contraception is not essential to restricting family size (only 60% of married women in Japan use it, fewer than in Costa Rica), but it helps.



## WORLD POPULATION

● Recent signs from Zimbabwe, Kenya and Botswana suggest that fertility may at last be starting to fall even in black Africa. Those three countries have increased contraceptive use dramatically. In Botswana, with its scattered population, few couples used contraception ten years ago. Today around 27% do so. In Kenya the figure is just over 20%, in Zimbabwe 40%. But these are small countries compared with Nigeria or Ethiopia, where contraception is rare.

● As people move into towns, they have smaller families. A recent survey of 22 developing countries found that in all of them urban fertility rates were lower than those in the countryside. Evidence from Asia and Latin America suggests that the bigger the city, the more likely women are to use contraception. One reason may be that services are easier to reach; another, that children cost more to raise in cities. As roughly half of the world's people will live in cities by the end of this century, that is good news.

Yet caution is in order. Past forecasts grossly underestimated population growth. In 1945 America's most eminent demographer thought that by the year 2000 the world would have 3 billion people. Since 1963 the UN demographers have repeatedly raised their projections. Their middle variant now predicts 8 billion people by 2020. Even this rests on conservative assumptions about mortality, which would, for instance, leave life expectancy in the less-developed world in 2020 no higher than in North America in 1950. In contrast, the assumptions about births are bold. Fertility in Europe and North America is assumed to stay below replacement level until 2020; in most poor countries to fall almost to that level; in Africa, where most women still want at least five children and have six or more, to be two-thirds of the way down to replacement.

This may be too bold. Since 1975 the decline in fertility seems to have levelled off in some third-world countries. In India, the world's second most populous country, the fertility rate has got stuck at 4.8. At that rate India would overtake China by the middle of the next century. In Indonesia fertility has dropped by more than a quarter since 1962,

to 4.3; but it has stuck there, close to the average number of children—4.1—that Indonesian parents want. So the population is still rising by 2% a year.

What happens to world population will depend disproportionately on China. Fertility there, after falling fast from six children per family to two, seems recently to have stalled. Why? Part of the answer may be that Chinese parents, like most Asians, long for a son. Experience in other Asian countries, such as South Korea, suggests that this longing may ultimately prevent fertility rates from declining to replacement levels.

### Babies: for and against

Demographers tell of an African leader who (supposedly) began a speech warning his countrymen against over-population, with the words: "My people, our birth rate is so high that our numbers will double in only 25 years and . . ." Wild cheering drowned the rest. Most developing countries now share the view of the leader rather than his audience. But the old Malthusian arguments against population growth have become more cautious and sophisticated with time.

The predictions of the early 1970s that all those extra mouths could not be fed have so far proved pessimistic. The proportion of the world's population suffering from malnutrition has declined (although the absolute number has risen). One reason is that food output in the poor countries rose by 3.1% a year between 1961 and 1980, well ahead even of their soaring populations. China and India, the two most populous countries, became self-sufficient in grain.

Nor is population growth necessarily bad for economic growth, as many people argued in the 1970s. Other factors—unstable government, anti-market economics—clearly matter more. A committee of America's National Academy of Sciences studying the economic effects of population growth in 1986 found little evidence of damaging links. Mr Julian Simon, an American economist, goes further and argues that population growth can foster development: "The ultimate resource is people—skilled, spirited and hopeful people." More people means



Poor Bombay


more new ideas, a bigger market, bigger production volumes, higher productivity, smaller transport distances.

Conversely, even the links between population growth and environmental damage are not clearcut. Fast-growing populations destroy more trees, but the stable ones of rich countries use more energy and produce more filth.

So why worry? One reason is that new births will not be evenly spread around the globe, but concentrated in countries which are already poor and often have difficulty feeding the mouths they already have. Above all, that means Africa, which will have three times as many people in 2025 as it does now. Its largest country, Nigeria, will have almost 370 people to the square kilometre—more than Holland today.

In theory, the world could almost certainly grow enough food to feed twice as many people as it now has. One study, quoted in the World Bank's 1984 World Development Report, reckoned that, if average farm yields rose from the present two tonnes of grain equivalent per hectare to five, the world could support about 11½ billion people. Each could enjoy "plant energy"—food, seed and animal feed—of 6,000 calories a day, the current global average (the typical North American uses about 15,000 calories, but most of that has gone long before he gets his mouth to it, in keeping his T-bone steak on the hoof).

A different approach, in a 1983 study by the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation, put together information on soil and climate. With basic fertilisers and pesticides, all cultivable land under food crops and the most productive crops grown on at least half the land, the study concluded that the world could in the year 2000 feed four times its projected population. Even with one-third of cultivable land under non-food crops, the world could feed 1½ times its projected





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population in 2150. Both Africa and South America could feed roughly ten times more people than today, if—it's a giant if—they switched entirely from peasant agriculture to the best practice of North America.

Even so, individual countries might starve. Using peasant techniques, 65 countries would need imports to feed their people by 2000. They would include 30 of Africa's 51 countries. Many of these—in east Africa and the Sahel—lie close to the sparsely populated lands of the central belt, which holds most of Africa's underused cultivable land. But increasingly tough controls on immigration may stop people moving to where the food is; and the poorest countries will not have the money to import it.

Rapid population growth may not prevent fast economic growth. But growth might be faster still without it, and would certainly be more equitable. Countries with high birth rates need to divert rising sums to education simply to stand still. They will need to raise investment rapidly, if income per worker is not to decline. A relatively large part of their workforce will be young, inexperienced and unskilled. That will hold back wages. Unemployment—or at least under-employment—will be endemic. Where most people work on the land (in poor countries the average is over two-thirds), many of the extra ones will have to find jobs in farming. Because the poor tend to have the biggest families, and the poorest countries (except China) tend to have the highest fertility, population growth will widen the gap between rich and poor both within and between countries.

Fast population growth does not always hurt the environment, but it makes harm more likely. People need fuel, and in many third-world countries wood is the main option. Already, the world is burning three times as much wood for fuel as it is growing. Cutting down trees causes soil erosion, which damages cropland, silts up dams and makes rivers less predictable.

Bulging cities bring other problems: Africa by 2025 will have 36 cities of 4m or more inhabitants and an average of 9m, more than greater London today. Yet as recently as 1950 no African city between Johannesburg and Cairo had even 1m inhabitants. Already, third-world cities face intractable problems of pollution and waste disposal, often linked. Fewer than a third of Indonesia's town-dwellers have safe ways to dispose of human waste, which therefore pollutes the water supply. The same story could be told from Lagos to Delhi, even though many third-world cities now spend a third or more of their budgets on collecting and disposing of refuse.

But the strongest arguments for slower population growth are not collective but individual. Fewer children means healthier and happier children. Short gaps between births do not just mean more babies; they

mean weaker mothers and higher infant mortality, more hunger and greater poverty. With a gap of less than two years between births, infant mortality is more than twice as high as when babies come four years apart. China grasped quickly the links between fertility and mortality: it added 27 years to life expectancy in the space of 30 years. Increasingly, family planning will be seen as a way to lessen not just births but child deaths.

### How to slow down

So how is population to be slowed? Broadly, as people get richer and—women especially—more educated, they want (and have) fewer children. But things are not quite that simple.

Under a fierce government, China, still one of the poorest countries, has cut fertility faster than any other. Brazil and Venezuela, well-off and rapidly industrialising, cut birth rates in 1965-75 by less than Sri Lanka or Thailand. Countries where income is equitably shared tend to have lower fertility than those where the gains of growth go to a lucky few.

Nor are the links between education and fertility straight-line. In general, well educated women do indeed have fewer children—four fewer in Colombia, for example—than the least educated. In poor coun-

Italy have its lowest.

Much depends on governments. Except for oddballs like Iraq, Kuwait and Singapore, which are trying to raise fertility, in the past 20 years most poor countries have begun to see the case against rapid population growth. The most dramatic change has been in Africa: the UN's population division found that in 1976 only one-third of Africa's governments thought fertility was too high, by last year two-thirds. But practice takes time to catch up with perception: in 1976 a quarter of them had policies for restricting fertility, in 1989 still only half.

Not that government promotion of family-planning services, or even their existence, is essential: countries whose governments are lukewarm or hostile to birth control, such as Colombia and Brazil, have still seen steep falls in fertility, and nineteenth-century France had a birth rate half that of Kenya today. But governments can certainly help.

The rich world too can help—if it chooses. In the 1980s, after a long period of rapid growth, foreign aid to family-planning programmes dropped sharply, thanks notably to the American right and President Reagan. Of course, foreign aid is not necessary: China has paid all the costs of its birth-control programme—around \$1 a head—it-



A way to cut child deaths

tries, though, women who have never been to school at all breastfeed for longer, and so have fewer babies, than those who have spent a few years at primary school.

At any given level of wealth or education, culture influences family size: Muslim societies, for instance, like those of Bangladesh and the Middle East, tend to large families, perhaps because of the inferior status they accord to women. But the link is intricate. The Catholic church condemns birth control, and Catholic Ireland duly has Europe's highest fertility; but parts of Catholic

self, and India four-fifths of its. But in most of the third world foreign aid has met roughly half the cost of family-planning policies, and the newer the policy, the higher the foreign share.

And rightly. Population programmes are a highly cost-effective way to raise living standards. More than 20 years ago President Lyndon Johnson argued that \$5 spent on family planning was as effective a way of promoting development as \$100 invested in increasing production. That ratio still holds.

EC 43 THIRD WORLD CHURCHES  
Mr. Moffett Fall 1986

Course description. This survey of trends, problems and opportunities in the churches of the "third world", will focus on Africa, Latin America and Oceania, with briefer attention to Asia which is more adequately covered in EC41. It will highlight a number of specific churches and nations, and will touch on such third world issues as the rise of the younger churches and the demise of colonialism, unreached areas, and third world missions. If time permits it will briefly introduce readings in third world theology.

Textbook. No textbook will be required, but frequent reference may be made to the following books on reserve in Speer library:

D. Barrett,	World Christian Encyclopedia
W. Buhlmann,	The Coming of the Third Church
E. Dayton,	The Future of World Evangelization: Unreached Peoples '84 (at desk)
C. G. Baeta,	Christianity in Tropical Africa Oxford Univ. Press 1968
E. Nida,	Understanding Latin America
F. Cooley,	The Growing Seed
C. Forman,	The Island Churches of the South Pacific

Requirements.

1. 1200 pages of reading from the list of recommended books (on the attached list).
2. Two book reports on books from the recommended list, or of your own choosing, in which case permission must be given by the professor. Each book report will contain a one-page outline or summary and an additional half page of your own personal reaction to the book, whether positive or negative. The first book report is due on November 3; the second on December 3.
3. A mid-term text, tentatively scheduled for November 23.
4. A 10 page term paper will be required on one of the suggested topics (list attached separately), OR on a subject of your own choosing (which must be approved by the professor). The term paper is due on the date set for the final exam.

Term papers and book reports may be turned in to the faculty secretary in Room 104 at 21 Dickinson Street. Any requests for time extensions or absences must be made to the office of Professional Studies in Room 118, Hodge Hall.



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The chart, (on p. 3 of the World by Eric) is something like this.

Christians Among Populations of the World.

	AD 30	500	1500	1800	1900	1980	2,000 AD.
White	5.0%	38.1	92.6	86.5	81.1	50.5	39.8
Black	—	—	0.3	3.0	4.5	18.0	22.9
Brown	—	1.4	1.5	3.0	5.1	10.8	13.0
Tan	95.0	59.5	4.8	2.2	5.0	10.6	11.8
Yellow	—	1.0	0.7	2.3	2.5	6.8	8.4
Red	—	—	—	3.0	1.7	3.1	—
Grey	—	—	—	—	0.1	0.2	—

Stylized skin colors.

- #5 Black - African, Negroid (world pop. 399,018,300) (p. 818 per cent)
- #2 Brown - Dravidian, N. Indian, Oceanic (world pop. 1,004,921,000)
- #4 Tan - Middle eastern, Iranian, some Latin American (world pop. 405,883,700)
- #3 White - Caucasian race; Uralian ethnolinguistically. (world pop. 918,190,700)
- #1 Yellow - Asian + Pacific ( " 1,550,480,000)
- Red - Amer. Ind. ( " 46,740,300)
- Grey - Austr. + S. Afr. bushmen. ( " 37,533,000)

The chart shows that the fastest declining color in world Christianity is white (from 81% in 1900 to 50% in 1980 to an estimated 40% in 2000 AD);

The fastest rising color is black (from 4 1/2% in 1900, to 18% in 1980, to 23% in 2000);

the third, <sup>in rate of growth,</sup> ~~the third,~~ <sup>though smaller in numbers + percentage</sup> is yellow (from 2 1/2% in 1900; to 7% in 1980 and 8 1/2% in 2,000); white's close fourth is brown (from 5% in 1900, to 11% in 1980 and 13% in 2,000).

Remember that in sheer numbers <sup>of people (not %)</sup> the largest colors are yellow (1 1/2 billion) and brown (1 billion), ~~compared to~~ and white (also nearly 1 billion). Black ~~and~~ (Africa) and tan (Middle East) each have about 1/2 a billion people.

6.

Think for a moment about what this means for the world Christian mission in our time. Here are some brief thoughts.

1. The old <sup>(spiritually & materially)</sup> power base of Christian missions is eroding. Christianity from the time of the Reformation (1500) to the 20<sup>th</sup> c. (1900) was exactly what the third-world sometimes still calls it - a "white man's religion".

2. But it isn't <sup>a white religion</sup> any longer. As of this year ~~it is~~ its colour is darker than white.

4. This probably means a shift in the base of mission from the west to the third-world if Christians are going to carry out ~~the~~ the Biblical mandate of reaching the whole world with ~~a~~ a clear, effective presentation of the ~~of~~ love and claims of Jesus Christ.

3. The power base of missions will probably shift to the ~~fast growing~~ peoples who are turning faster to find Jesus Christ as lord of Saviors than others - <sup>the</sup> to blacks, yellows, and brown races of this world.

5. Therefore, in any planning for the future of the Christian church, of its world mission, it is absolutely imperative



that ~~is to be~~ the third-world churches ~~are~~ become an indispensable part of ~~our~~ the planning and operation.

Western planning for world mission, if it is done in isolation from the churches of the third world, is obsolete. Nothing but cooperative world planning for world Christian mission will do in today's world. We live in a new situation.

II. But color, as we know, is a very imperfect, highly stylized criterion for dividing the world's population into categories - though it is still one of the most prevalent. Another but widely used category is political. We divide up the world's population by countries. Here too we find a startling change: - In Carey's day

If we measure the spread of Christianity politically by blocs of countries, as of 1950,

The Western world's 35 countries had 38% of the world's pop. (547 m.)
The Communist world's 30 countries has 18% " " " (254 m.)
The Third world's 158 countries has 44% " " " (631 m.)

- World In Enc. - p. 4. Table 2

The Encyclopedia (p. 3), in reporting on this distribution of the world by countries, goes on to say that,

(8)

"In 2/3 of the world's 223 countries, Christians now form the majority (over 50%); in one-third [of the world's countries they are still a] minority. This spread is very uneven though (see Global Map 1). Christians number under 90% in 100 countries; less than 10% in 51 countries; less than 1% in 24 countries, and less than 1/10 of 1% in 6 countries: Afghanistan, Bhutan, Nepal, Somalia, North Yemen and South Yemen. (p. 3).

I note that Nepal is classified as 1/10 of 1% Christian, but these figures are as of a few years ago. Today thanks to the low-key but amazingly effective witness of the United Mission to Nepal, in just the last three or four years, I think that Nepal, though still in the class of regions where public evangelism is absolutely forbidden, has become at least more than 1% (not 1/10 of 1%) Christian.

2/5/85



Int

B. Introduction to the Third World Churches.

But it is the 3<sup>rd</sup> world churches which is the primary subject of this course. So before we turn to continental surveys of African, Latin American and Asian Christianity, let me make some preliminary observations about the situation of the churches in the third world.

First, ~~how does the church compare~~ the Christian church is extremely unevenly distributed in the third world. Its percentage of the population, <sup>(counting total Xn adherents)</sup> on the ~~the~~ three third-world continents ranges from

		Xns.	Pop.
①	93.8% in Latin America	(348,658,000)	371,870,640,000
④	44.2% in Africa	(203,491,000)	460,857,000
⑥	5.1% in Asia.	(128,078,000)	2,514,550,000
[②]	86.4% in Oceania	(20,299,000)	23,482,000

In other words, comparing Asia and Latin America the situation — World Xn Dir, p 78-81.

is practically mirror-reversed: Latin America about 95% nominal Christian; Asia about 95% nominal non-Christian — with Africa half-way between.

By way of comparison, perhaps I should add 1<sup>st</sup> + 2<sup>nd</sup> world figures. —

②	88.3% in North America	(219,833,000)	248,837,000
③	85.4% in Europe	(415,601,000)	488,435,000
⑤	30.1% in USSR	(26,720,000)	268,115,000

If we exclude largely Christian (<sup>statistically</sup> ~~technically~~ Christian) Latin America, and examine Asia and Africa a little more closely as to the religious situation on those two continents, it is better perhaps to divide them into three sections: Africa, South Asia and East Asia.

Africa is almost evenly divided between Christians and Muslims, with Christians recently having a slight edge. Before 1970 Muslims had been in the majority. But in 1980 the statistics were

Christians	203 million (203,490,000)	- 44.2%	of Africa's population
Muslims	190 million (189,728,000)	- 41.2%	" "
Tribal religions	64 million (63,872,000)	- 13.9%	" "

(World Kn. Enc., p. 782)

Moving east ~~into~~ across the Red Sea + Indian ocean into Asia, beginning with South Asia (which includes the Asian Middle East), the largest religious grouping is Hindu, with Muslims second. <sup>Buddhist + Kn a fairly pm 3rd + 4th but rather clartyfied.</sup> In 1980 -

Hindus	515 million (515,368,000)	- 41.2%
Muslims	405 million (405,286,000)	- 32.4%
Buddhists	135 " (134,508,000)	- 9.4%
Christians	109 " (109,051,000)	- 7.6%

East Asia, again, is very different. In 1980, by far the largest grouping called itself "non-religious".

Non-religious	550 million (549,340,000)	- 50.5%
Chinese folk-rel.	190 " (189,670,000)	- 15.3%
Buddhists	138 " (137,887,000)	- 12.7%
Atheists	113 " (112,653,000)	- 10.4%



New Religions	34 million (34,291,000)	3.2%
Muslims	22 million (21,491,000)	2.0%
<del>Shamanists</del>	<del>13 million (13,055,000)</del>	<del>1.2%</del>
Christians	19 million (19,026,000)	1.8%
Shamanists	13 " (13,055,000)	1.2%

Confucian 0.5  
 Shinto 0.3

2 p. 30, 1986

Population 1980.

Africa	461 million	
[ S. Asia	1,427 million	]
S. Asia	1,087 million	
Asia	2,514 million	
Europe	486 million	
L. America	372 million	
USSR	268 million	
N. America	249 million	
Oceania	24 million	(p. 78) (18.4 m. in Austr/NZ; 5 m. in the islands)

World's Largest Protestant Churches (Barrett, 1982)

Rank	Church Name	Admits	Members	Rank	
				1951	1968
1.	CHURCH OF CHRIST ZAIRE	(4) 1,519,499	4,728,280		
2.	ASSEMBLIES OF GOD, BRAZIL	(1) 2,783,000	4,000,000	18	2
3.	PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENT CHURCH (AGLIPIAY)	(3) 1,860,000	3,500,000	1	1
4.	KIMBANGVIST CHURCH, ZAIRE	(2) 2,000,000	3,500,000		
5.	ANGELICAN CHURCH NIGERIA	359,969	2,941,000	10	6
6.	Dutch Ref. Church of S. Africa (Federal Council) PROTESTANT (REF.) CHURCH, INDONESIA	(5) 987,000	2,142,000 1,958,710		[11]
7.	NIGERIA FELLOWSHIP of CHURCHES of CHRIST (SUM)	100,553	1,746,000		
8.	CHURCH of SOUTH INDIA	(9) 515,700	1,555,902		4
9.	CHURCH OF CHRIST, MANALISTA (PHILIPPINES)	(12) 400,000	1,500,000		
10.	ANGELICAN CHURCH, UGANDA	306,355	1,383,951	12	19
11.	PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN KOREA, HAPDONG	200,000	1,298,295		16
12.	ANGELICAN CHURCH, SOUTH AFRICA	327,436	1,235,446		
13.	DUTCH REFORMED CHURCH, SOUTH AFRICA (WHITE)	(1) 799,876	1,200,000		
14.	COUNCIL of BAPTIST CHURCHES in N.E. INDIA	230,200	1,064,990	11	10
15.	BAPTIST CONVENTION OF BRAZIL	350,244	1,050,000	10	12
16.	BATAK CHRISTIAN PROTESTANT CHURCH, INDONESIA	(10) 465,457	1,044,382	5	5
17.	PENTECOSTAL CHURCHES of INDONESIA	(7) 750,000	1,000,000		
18.	CONGREGATIONS CRISTA, BRAZIL (PARANET)	(8) 600,000	1,000,000		9
19.	PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH OF KOREA, TONGHAP	253,600	1,000,000		15
20.	EVANGELICAL PENTECOSTALS, BRAZIL FOR CHRIST	250,000	1,000,000		
21.	SOUTH AFRICAN METHODIST CHURCH	373,635	942,545		
22.	METHODIST CHURCH IN SOUTH ASIA	(11) 421,109	901,306	7	14
23.	MADAGASCAR CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST	250,000	881,487		
24.	BURMA BAPTIST CONVENTION	248,966	798,560	8	13
25.	UNITED EV. LUTHERAN CHS IN INDIA	339,690	790,440	12	15
26.	CHURCH of CENTRAL AFRICA, PRESBYTERIAN (MALAWI)	282,171	766,000	11	7

Presb. 5

Pentecostal 4

Anglican 4

B. 3

United 3

Indep. 3

Lutheran 2

Methodist 2



LATIN AMERICA

Today I want to introduce <sup>you to</sup> the third world churches of the Western Hemisphere - that part of the western hemisphere which lies south of the United States of America. We <sup>will</sup> call it Latin America - but the term is a little hard to justify.

~~I don't want to waste time on <sup>the</sup> language of what we call this area.~~ Why America, for example? As Dr. Mackay used to point out when I was a student here - It should be called "Columbia" - all this part of the world. Columbus was the discoverer; Americus Vesputti was only a second-rate explorer, but much better at publicity than Columbus - so <sup>why</sup> we are in America not Columbia. Incidentally, what Columbus discovered <sup>in 1492</sup> was not North America, but Latin America - first the Bahamas (NE of Cuba), then Cuba (where he expected to find the descendants of Genghis Khan), then Santo Domingo (Dominican Rep.). It was on his 3<sup>rd</sup> voyage (1498) that he discovered the mainland, in what is now Venezuela.

So if anyone has priority in choosing a ~~new~~ modern name for ~~the~~ themselves - it is not we up here, who call ourselves ~~the~~ Americans, <sup>though we are really</sup> ~~but we are~~ only North Americans - but the people of the south - who call themselves Americans - who think of us

as quite properly Norteamericanos, or Yanguis, or just gringos. They have first rights to the name Americans - <sup>but they do have</sup> ~~but~~ not a first rights to the land. In Latin America, & in

North America the land first belonged to the people we both now call Indians.

The people of Latin America are Americans, says Geo. P. Howard. "The citizens of the U.S. have monopolized the term, but it should be remembered that Latin Americans are not Spaniards, they are Americans." (We Amer. N. of S., p. 7)

(2)

And it is well to be reminded of that fact in any discussion of the prevailing contemporary Theological movement in Latin America - "Liberation Theology". It is the Indians, not the Latin Americans who have first rights to the call for liberation from oppression.

~~The first~~  
To review the history. <sup>①</sup> The Indians were discovered and colonized from 1492 to 1806. The colonial period. (1492-1806). Since the colonizers were Spaniards, Portuguese or ~~then~~ to a much lesser degree French (all speaking Latin-derived languages) - the region became known as Latin America. But the Latins, in Latin America, were the colonialists, transformed from colonialists into nationalists by a revolution (just as the ~~United~~ Americans of the U.S.A. are colonialists, transformed into nationalists by a revolution).

② The second period, then is the revolution (1806-1825). The Latin American revolution, <sup>beginning in Argentina in 1806</sup> came some 30 years later than the North American revolution of 1776 - and lasted about 20 years. The Gen. Washington of the South was Simon Bolivar. But unlike the northern revolution, the southern <sup>revolution</sup> never united the former colonies into a United States. Bolivar dreamed of a united republican government for all the south. It never happened. <sup>Roman Catholic</sup> Church interests and <sup>the</sup> ~~upper class~~ dominance of an elite minority (the upper class) made democracy impossible. The population ~~was~~ (of Span. Am.) was 19% white, 31% mestizo, 45% Indian, 4% black - and regional greeds proved more powerful <sup>than</sup> the ideal of continental unity.



③ So the third period (1825 - ) is the rise of the Latin nations.

Originally about 9 or 10 nations: Argentina, ~~Paraguay~~, Brazil (which didn't become a republic until 1889),  
Bolivia, Paraguay, Peru, Colombia (to the Panama Canal), Guiana,  
Mexico <sup>(including Texas, California)</sup> and the United Provinces of Central America.  
Venezuela seceded from Colombia in 1830.

But there are ~~three~~ <sup>three</sup> major regions: Spanish South America, Portuguese ~~South America~~,  
Central America (merely divided between large Mexico, and the smaller republics) - and the Caribbean.

But it is also divided by languages into 4 groups: -

1. Spanish - from Mexico to Argentina.
2. Portuguese - the largest country of all, Brazil, doesn't speak Spanish.
3. French - Haiti.
4. English - pockets of English language nations, united in "Caricom".

12 members: Antigua + Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana,  
① Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Lucia, St. Kitts-Nevs, St. Vincent and Grenadines,  
② Trinidad + Tobago - with Bahamas as observer.

5,400,000 people (Jamaica 2,200,000; Tr. + Tob. 1,000,000; Guyana 900,000).

Altogether, Latin America usually refers to the 20 countries south of Cuba - plus some of the now independent smaller islands of the Caribbean.

In size - this is a land area roughly equal to Europe and the United States combined: 25 percent mountains; 25% swampy land; and 10% desert, or very dry.

The people are a broad mixture - <sup>①</sup> Indians (the original inhabitants, called Indians because Columbus thought he had found India) number about ~~20~~<sup>45</sup> million. They are about 91% kn. - ~~There is the lowest percentage of Christians - about 80% -~~ <sup>but have the</sup> ~~the~~ highest percentage of the unreachd, evangelistically. It is the Indian population that has suffered the ~~most~~ sharpest decline in <sup>②</sup> population, as a result of the Latin conquest - from 45% of the population in 1800 to 15% today.

② The white, or Spanish/Portuguese (and in Argentine, British) colonialists - number about 131 million - or <sup>about</sup> 45% of the 300 m. total (as of ~~1970~~<sup>2010</sup> years ago - ca. 1973) <sup>They are 90% Christian.</sup> This has been the fastest growing segment - from 19% in 1800 to 45% today. <sup>Interests</sup>

③ The metizo segment (a blend of white and Indian) numbers about 118 million, or 40% of the population - and are about 92.5% Christian. But the difference in percentage of Christians in the three ethnic groups is negligible - from 92½% among mestizos (the highest) to 90% among the whites - the lowest - a spread of only 2½%.

The latest figure - an extrapolation of growth rates to 1980 - gives the percentage of Christians in Latin America slightly higher - 93.8%. And it further high-lights the greatest physical danger looming on the Latin American scene - not nuclear explosion but a population explosion - a population figure expanding even faster than Asia's - though numerically much smaller. In 1900 Latin



L. America had:

1900	-	65 million	
1970	-	283 million	(an <sup>average</sup> increase of 21 m. every 10 yrs)
1980	-	377 million	(an increase of 89 m. in last 10 yrs.)
2000.	-	620 million.	(an av. increase of 124 m. every 10 yrs)

From 65 million to 620 million in ~~one~~ <sup>one</sup> century is an unmanageable explosion.

I doubt if Latin America's basic social and economic problem is either political oppression or foreign economic imperialism. Both are serious problems - but I suspect it is population pressure that ignites the fires that keep them explosive.

Empirically, I find it hard to quantify the challenge of Latin America. The World Christian Encyclopedia <sup>(update)</sup> lists the continent as ~~63%~~ <sup>95%</sup> ~~evangelized~~ (i.e. nominally Chr.) in 1900, and ~~94%~~ <sup>92% Christian</sup> ~~evangelized~~ in 1980 - <sup>1989</sup> which indicates that the ratio of nominal Chr. to population has almost kept even with the population explosion. Again the unanswered question is - "How many of the nominal Christians are as effectively unreached as the statistically unreached."

But more on that later. Let me now turn to the third-world churches in Latin America.

First, two preliminary observations.

1. First, Latin America, as a continent is unique in the third world in that it is the only one of the three (Africa, Asia, Lat. Am) that is massively <sup>92%</sup> (94%) Christian. In comparison, Africa is only half-Christian (44%) and Asia barely touched (4%±). Only Oceania <sup>(86%)</sup> comes anywhere near Latin America in percentage of Chr., if we consider it separately from Asia. In the West - Russia is less Christian than Africa (36%); Europe less Christian than Oceania - 85½%; and North America less Christian than Latin America - 88.3%.

2. Latin America is massively Roman Catholic. It is virtually impossible to draw meaningful comparisons between the Roman Catholic church in that southern continent, and the small groups of Protestants.

How can you compare a block of 528 million Christians in one Catholic church, to a comparative handful of 17 million-plus <sup>present</sup> Protestants (called "evangelicals" in L.A.) divided among 3,503 different denominations?

3. The fastest growing, most divided, but still most significant segment of Latin American Protestantism is the Pentecostal. In country after country, the largest churches & denominations are not Presbyterian, Episcopal, Methodist, Lutheran or even Baptist, but Pentecostal.



The largest denominations in Latin America. —

	Militated	Actual	
1. Assemblies of God, Brazil	4,000,000	2,783,000	
2. <sup>Catholic</sup> Apostolic Church of Brazil (ex RC)	2,000,000	1,000,000	(ex R.C.)
3. Brazil Baptist Convention	1,050,000	350,294	(Southern Bapt.)
4. Pentecostal Ch. of Brazil for Christ	1,000,000	250,000	(ex As. of God)
5. Christian Communities of Brazil	1,000,000	600,000	(ind. Pent., Italian origin)
6. Evangelical <sup>Confessional</sup> Lutherans of Brazil	629,000	136,000	(German Luth.)
7. Presb. Ch. of Brazil	623,000	124,900	(UPCUSA - PCUS)
8. Methodist Pentecostals, Chile	400,000	150,000	(split from Meth, 1909 - 20 schism since)
9. Evangelical Pentecostal, Chile	400,000	200,000	(split from M. Pent. 5 yrs. mission)
10. Union of Evangelical Ind. Churches, Mexico	350,000	150,000	(Pentecostal, <sup>OTOMI</sup> Otomi Inds.)

→ 7 out of first ten are in Brazil.  
 → 6 out of first ten are Pentecostal.

11. <del>Mormons, Mexico</del>			
11. Seventh Day Adventists, Brazil	300,000		
12. National Crusade for Evangelization	200,000		
13. Evangelical Luth. Ch. of <sup>Mexico</sup>	156,000		(ICFE = split from Evangelical Ch. of Lutheran Confession)
13. Ind. Presb. Ch. of Brazil	150,000		(1976 schism from Presb. Ch. Brazil)
14. Union of Evangelical Baptists	169,835		(Bapt. General Conf. USA)
14. <del>Evangelical Luth. Ch. of Mexico</del>	150,000		
15. Mormons, Mexico	112,000		
16. Assemblies of God, Mexico	100,000		
17. Assemblies of God, Chile	100,000		(split from Evangel. Pentec.)
18. Evangelical Meth. Pentecostal Renewed	100,000		(split from Meth. Pent.)
19. Pentecostal Ch. of Chile	100,000		(split from Meth. Pent. 1961. WCC)
20. Jehovah's Witnesses, Mexico	100,000		

Percentage of population Protestant

Chile - 22.5% = 3 m.

Guatemala - 20.4% = 2 m.

Brazil 17.4% = 24 m. (18 m baptized Brazilian RC have joined evangelical or other groups.)

- WCE 1980  
 of World 1987

The Pentecostals

When the then president of this seminary, Dr. John Mackay, returned from a trip to Latin America in <sup>the early</sup> 1950s, - I remember him reporting to shocked audiences here on the campus, and in denominational and ecumenical ~~head~~ headquarters in New York:

"The future of the Gospel in Latin America is in the hands of the Roman Catholics & the Pentecostals."

That was almost heresy back in 1950. <sup>The future of Latin America is the hands of R. Catholics?</sup> ~~with~~ <sup>mainline</sup>

Protestantism was <sup>confidently</sup> challenging ~~the~~ Roman Catholic ascendancy <sup>all across the world</sup> ~~in all of it~~ through its ~~new~~ new ecumenical base in Geneva, & its far-flung, still-growing missionary empire ~~across~~ around the world globe. And who should know better than John Mackay - who had consistently told us that <sup>political</sup> Catholicism was a greater threat to South America than communism. Yet here he was, abandoning ship as it were - after all his years as a missionary in Peru - and turning ~~one~~ back the continent to his old reactionary foes - the Catholic Church in S. America.

And to the Pentecostals, that was just as bad. In the 1950s - Pentecostals were Holy Rollers, the limatic fringe, strong on emotion but sadly lacking in ~~theology~~ ~~doctrine~~ and intellect.

How could the President of Princeton be so naive. ~~Methodists, Presbyterians~~



~~Baptists were~~  
The Roman Catholics had already failed. They had had their chance in Latin America for 200 years - I had only veneered the surface ~~with~~ a of the continent. ~~with <sup>Catholic</sup> Latin America~~ with a nominal form of Xty which could never stand up against the real thing - Protestantism.

As for the Pentecostals - they might make a <sup>loud noise and a</sup> large splash, but there was no way they would ever match the solid missionary advance of real churches - like the Presbyterians, Methodists & Baptists.

But Dr. Mackay of course was right. <sup>Now, 30 years later,</sup> Catholic renewal, and Pentecostal vigor are ~~now~~ so obviously the wave of the inevitable future, that there is no way to begin a study of the third-world churches in Latin America with Presbyterians, Methodists and Baptists. Don't count them out - I can't let you do that - but I can't be fair to Latin American realities and begin with ~~them~~ - mainline Protestant denominations.

Oct. 27, '86

# I. The Roman Catholics.

This course puts its emphasis on the Protestant churches of the third world. But in Latin America the Roman Catholics were not only there first by about 300 years; they are still first.

94 and 85 out of every 100 Latin Americans call themselves Catholics; only between 4 and 5 call themselves Protestant. (85 professing + 2 nominal) (perhaps 8 if total affiliated) 10% (perhaps 10% if total affiliated)

So we must begin with the Roman Catholics, however briefly. The actual figures are (according to the World in Enc.) - (p. 763)

1985	1990	1985	1990
342m - 73.0%	348,600,000	Total Christians - adherents	428,000,000
369 - 88.1	328,900,000	Roman Catholics - professing	328,900,000 (82.5%)
20.7 - 5%	17,798,000	Protestants/Ang/indig. -	17,798,000 (4.7%)
12.8 - 3.1%	11,000,000	Non-religious	11,000,000 (2.9%)
5.2 - 1.3%	4,353,000	Spiritists	4,353,000 (1.1%)
1.17 - 0.3%	2,032,000	Atheists	2,032,000 (0.5%)
.91 - 0.2	1,173,000	Tribal	1,173,000 (0.3%)

95% of a continental pop. of 451,000,000. 371,600,000. 37.6m = 8.3%

1987 - Spain w. 51. Xns = 95%

RC 325m = 83%

Prot 38m = 10%

World 8m = 2.2%

Anim. 7m = 2.1%

It is a mistake for Protestants to dismiss Latin American

Christianity as nominal or Christo-pagan. Too much of it is, as most writers agree. But the anti-Catholicism of 30 or 40 years ago - with its pejorative comparisons of North American - South American Xty - such as the oft-quoted remark: "The Puritans came to America looking for God; the Spanish came looking for gold" - is only half-true at best, and badly out of touch with present realities in the western hemisphere.



It ~~and~~ queries the most important single development in Latin American Christianity in our time - the Roman Catholic renewal movement.

Catholic renewal in Latin America is not new. It began in a small way back at the turn of the century. When Dr. Mackay visited the continent on his survey in the 1950s, it was picking up speed rapidly, as he correctly observed; and in the 1960s, as my friend Dayton Roberts ~~told me~~ told me in Costa Rica this summer, it continued to accelerate, even faster, under the impetus of Vatican II (1960-65), and peaked at the great Conference of Latin American Bishops (CELAM) in Medellin, 1968. (Concejo Episcopal Latinoamericano).

It all began with a rediscovery of the Bible. About 1903 Pope Leo XIII established an Institute of Biblical Studies in Rome. It was, someone has said "a ticking time bomb" whose power to explode spiritual power through a check <sup>which had</sup> for centuries <sup>been</sup> comparatively unexplosive to open Bible study was largely unrecognized - until the explosion came in waves of renewal. In 1943 Pius XII gave permission for the first time for <sup>fresh</sup> translations of Scriptures from the original tongues - a whole spate of new Spanish translations appeared - and whole new orders were created to translate the Bible and study it.

Vatican II, at the beginning of the 1960s flung the windows wide open for winds of change in Catholicism. It changed Catholic attitudes toward Protestants. It gave 3<sup>rd</sup> world bishops a voice and an ~~less~~ effective hearing for the first time. It admitted the need to re-evangelize Latin America. Anticipating Vatican II, the Latin American bishops had already organized themselves as a Latin American Episcopal Conference (CELAM) at Rio de Janeiro 1955.

The second meeting of that Conference (CELAM) at Medellin in 1968 was a decisive landmark — the high point of Catholic Renewal in the continent. <sup>(It brought the 130 Lat. American bishops together to survey their situation.)</sup> ~~It ~~was~~ ~~not~~ ~~just~~ ~~a~~ ~~meeting~~ ~~for~~ ~~the~~ ~~continent~~ ~~but~~ ~~for~~ ~~the~~ ~~continent~~ ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~world~~~~ The result has been described as "a platform for revolution": — Three points can be made, to summarize: —

- ① Its self-judgment on Latin Am. Catholicism. "For the first time in history, the Latin American hierarchy recognized that the continent [had not been Christianized, but] I was living in a 'situation of sin'." (Penry Lemux, in Puebla of Beyond, ed. J. Seaplan and P. Schaefer, p. 11., Orbis, 1980)
  - ② Its recognition of the priority of a "gospel for the poor". And, in part, as a response ~~to this~~
  - ③ Its espousal of Liberation Theology as the RC theology of mission for L.A. [But it did condemn Marxism - p. 11]. ~~This ~~sent~~ ~~shock~~ ~~waves~~ ~~through~~ ~~the~~ ~~continent~~~~
- Medellin 1968 "sent ~~sent~~ shock waves through the continent and beyond, to Europe and to North America". Its strong social criticism and prophetic commitment



were a complete about-face for <sup>the</sup> socially and politically entrenched Roman Catholicism with which the world had become familiar. Read "Pueblo and Beyond", ed. by John Eapleson & Philip Schaffer, if you are interested in Latin American Catholicism since Medellin. "Rich or poor, radical or reactionary," says one commentator in that book (Penny Lernoux), "Latin Americans were dumbfounded [by Medellin]: how could traditionally conservative bishops have written such a document!"

Nov. 79

Politically as well as religiously it was an eye-opener. Nelson Rockefeller shrewdly realized <sup>this</sup> when he toured the region for the U.S. govt. the next year. He reported two <sup>crucial</sup> important factors that U.S. foreign policy must recognize: —

- ① An upsurge in nationalism + the determination of the people to seek social change
  - ② His conviction "that the military and the Church would be the principal actors in Latin America's coming political drama."
- (Ibid, p. 12, cituj "Quality of life in the Americas... Dept. of State Bulletin, 8 Dec. 1969, p. 15.

But Medellin was not quite "a platform for revolution". Even at Medellin, the bishops were divided, and after Medellin, between 1968 and the next bishops' conference at Pueblo, 1979, the pendulum, as it so often does, swung back from revolution toward moderation. In Chile — the reaction polarized Catholics: a Belgian Jesuit, Vekemans, openly challenging the ~~left-wing~~ leader of left-wing priests Gonzalo Arango. European

Theologians openly scrutinized and criticized ~~the~~ the theology of liberation of which Medellin & Latin America in general was proud, undermining its influence at Rome. Colombia's Cardinal, Amal Pinoy Dugre, leader of the dissenting conservatives at Medellin sponsored "a hemispheric seminar on 'Marxist penetration' in the church, and helped to elect the conservative Colombian bishop Alfonso Lopez Trujillo as the secretary-general of CELAM (the Bishops' Conference). Finally, Rome elected a Pope from Poland who had no illusions about Marxism, and emotionally would find difficulty in understanding Latin America's pre-Marxian enthusiasm for revolution in a Marxian world.

The result was Puebla, 1979, a Conference that heard Pope ~~Paul~~ John Paul II warn against political activity and support the pastoral and spiritual functions of the priesthood. But it was not a total repudiation of Medellin. It is said that ~~Pope John~~ the Pope had seen too much poverty ~~in~~ in Mexico on his trip to Puebla. Puebla, as Time put it, may have been "a rejection of liberation theology" but remained "a plea for liberation from poverty." (Puebla + Beyond, pp. 34-37).

In which direction - left, right or center - Latin America 'Catholicism' will move in the 80s remains to be seen. But some cautionary word may be in order before Protestants, accept let Pro-Catholicism as so far renewed and purified that Protestantism should abdicate & leave the continent to Rome.

Mar. 2, 1985



complacent. Early converts from Catholicism said that "there are few whom they know in the Roman Catholic Church who know the facts of Christ's life and fewer still who know Christ."<sup>13</sup> Robert Speer wrote in 1913, "The very crucifixes of which South America is full misrepresent the Gospel;"<sup>14</sup> he went on to note that "even the dead Christ is the subordinate figure. The central place is Mary's."<sup>15</sup> The gospel simply was not being preached by the Catholic Church in the early part of this century, and thus Catholic claims that Latin America was Christian were invalid.

The view that Latin America is no longer in need of missionaries, or even evangelists, has been challenged by both Catholics and ecumenically minded Christians since the 1950s. At the 1953 Catholic Action Congress in Chimbote, Peru, some 300 Catholics from throughout the continent reached the conclusion that "the vast majority are only...nominal Catholics."<sup>16</sup> Likewise from the ecumenical side, Julio de Santa Ana wrote, "Latin America remains a mission field."<sup>17</sup> Not surprisingly, this conclusion has also been reached by evangelicals like Samuel Escobar, who calls Latin America "a pagan continent with a thin veneer of Christianity."<sup>18</sup> Thus there is widespread agreement today that the task of preaching the good news of Jesus Christ has not been accomplished in Latin America.

Why not then make common cause with the Roman Catholic Church to reach the continent for Christ? Why not work hand in hand to bring the gospel, instead of fighting hand to hand over issues that divide the Catholic from the Protestant Church? The answer to this type of question depends upon one's answer

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to the question, "Has the Catholic Church changed for the better in Latin America since the early 1900s?" In other words, have the divisive issues that led to the Reformation and led Protestant missionaries to enter Latin America in significant numbers since the turn of the century been resolved? The evangelicals and Pentecostals have answered, "No." The abuses that gave rise to the Reformation have not been corrected, and new ones - such as the dogma of the corporal assumption of Mary, promulgated in 1950 - have been created. The literally millions of converts from Catholicism to Protestant Christianity are nearly unanimous in this verdict.

There is, however, a vocal minority of Protestants involved in the ecumenical movement in Latin America who disagree. Miguel Bonino, called by C. Rene Padilla "perhaps the most outstanding Latin American Protestant theologian today,"<sup>19</sup> wrote in 1969 that one now meets "a wholly new Catholicism, a Catholicism that is cleansed of Marian excesses, evangelized, more biblical."<sup>20</sup> The vast majority of Latin American Protestants would disagree, pointing to endemic Mariolatry, sacramentalism, papal infallibility, worship of images, prayers for the dead and to the saints, and the entire "sacrifice of the Mass" as reason enough to deny any substantial change in the Catholic Church since the Reformation. Indeed, even the immediate cause of Martin Luther's protest - the granting of indulgences from punishment in purgatory - has continued to be an integral part of the Catholic faith.<sup>21</sup>

Bonino responds to those who express their doubt that the Catholic Church has in fact changed: "People who think thus

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strive to interpret any Catholic renewal as a tactical maneuver or at best as only a superficial change: 'Rome changes not.'<sup>22</sup> A comparison of the Canon Law published in 1917 with the 1983 edition will show that in spite of modifications (use of the vernacular, etc.), Rome has in fact not changed. Even on the practical level, the "disappearance of the most eye-catching differences within folk-Catholicism,"<sup>23</sup> which Bonino claims has already happened, has in fact not happened. Only if one grants that Bonino is correct in asserting that the Catholic Church has changed profoundly can one accept his conclusion: "Protestant churches stand before a challenging fact of Catholic renewal, in relation to which our artificial divisions are a scandal."<sup>24</sup>

Padilla, Castro, and Theo Tschuy, former secretary of the WCC Commission on Inter-Church Aid for Latin America, agree with Bonino. Padilla wrote recently that for the Protestant Church in Latin America, "the renewal of Roman Catholicism has outdated its strictly 'Protestant' role."<sup>25</sup> Castro believes, "Today's Catholicism is fundamentally different from that which the first Protestant missionaries encountered."<sup>26</sup> This point of view naturally makes him and others who share it very open to dialogue and even active cooperation with the Roman Catholic Church. Costas quotes de Santa Ana approvingly: "Protestants and Catholics must increasingly seek ways to witness jointly to their common faith."<sup>27</sup> Tschuy wrote in 1969, "The Vatican Council has sprung the fetters of the past. Christians on both sides of the trench have grasped that they belong to the same Church of Christ."<sup>28</sup> He celebrates the current openness to Rome and ascribes past and present trepidation on the part of those who

PENTECOSTALS

LATIN AMERICA

II. The Pentecostals

The Pentecostals are at the other end of the ecclesiastical spectrum from the Roman Catholic. They are the second-most important religions grouping in the continent - but in terms of fast growth, they are first. They are the fastest growing segment of Latin American ~~Roman~~ Protestantism - which in itself has shocked <sup>that</sup> basically Catholic continent by the growth of the evangelicals in a ~~the~~ normally Christian land.

<sup>+ the World Chr. Inc.</sup>  
 Peter Wagner gives the statistics of Prot growth: - (look out! - p. 25)

In 1900 -	about 50,000	} Composite - World Chr Inc. + Wagner 1900 - 1,500,000 (affiliates) 1950s - passed 5,000,000 1960s " 10,000,000 1970s " 20,000,000 1980 " 32,000,000. 1985 " 37,600,000
1930s -	growth passed the 1,000,000 mark.	
1940s -	passed 2,000,000	
x 1950s -	passed 5,000,000	
x 1960s -	passed 10,000,000	
1970s -	as early as 1973 was already past 20,000,000	
1980 -	World Chr. Inc. gives 32 million affiliated Prot/Eng/Arg. in Lat. Am.	
1985 -	" 37.6 " " " "	

Compare World Chr Inc.:

1900 -	1,660,000	affiliates.
1970 -	21,740,000	"
1980 -	32,070,000	"
1985 -	37,600,000	"





aren't neutral in the face of sociological phenomena.

Evangelical church growth in Latin America represents a growth in thought, feeling, disposition and mentality, which is in the process of permeating all levels of Latin society.

And when I talk about the evangelical mentality, I'm not talking about an intellectual phenomenon, but spirituality.

Evangelical spirituality means the Gospel's complete transformation of a person's mind, feelings, will, relationships and plans.

The statistical analyses of church growth give data showing a certain rate of growth in a certain place at a certain time—helpful in formulating strategies and tactics. But it seems to me the Spirit of the Lord is weaving together these different threads of church growth.

#### What does it mean to you to be evangelical and to be Latin American?

The evangelical identity is found in Jesus Christ. We don't base our evangelical identity in an organization, but in the person of Jesus Christ our Lord. Perhaps the Christo-centric element is our fundamental, irreplaceable characteristic. Christ. And no one else but Christ.

As far as being Latin American, I feel we Latins have an obligation to the world. We've been influenced by and related to so many currents of thought from countries all over the world. I think that our Latin Americanness is affirmed in our universality.

#### What does that say about world evangelicalism?

Evangelical thought today isn't North American or Latin American or European or African or Asian. Today, evangelical thought is international in nature.

Think about leaders in the Lausanne movement. Who is more respected theologically. . . Tom Houston of Scotland or Samuel Escobar of Peru? Peter Kuzmic of Yugoslavia or Harvey Conn of the United States?

This is evangelical thought at the international level. The old geographic divisions we've tried to maintain are becoming a thing of the past. □

## Four Factors Boost Evangelical Growth

Latin America Evangelist's Paul Pretiz, with almost 40 years' experience in Latin America, suggested these factors contributing to the recent accelerated growth of Latin evangelical churches.

### 1 External circumstances:

Socio-political crises have made people spiritually open. Some writers see the flow into evangelical churches as an escape from reality, but there's another way of looking at this: that the ultimate reality is God's sovereignty over history and our lives.

Another factor is disenchantment with the Roman Catholic Church, ranging from not enough priests to go around, to rebellion against the religious establishment, to people seeing contradictions between Scripture and church teachings.

### 2 Scripture and Christian media:

Another factor is the increased accessibility of Scripture, including the popular easy-to-read versions. As to the media, I see a definite link between the rapid growth of the evangelical movement in Central America and the fact every country has evangelical radio stations.

### 3 Mobilization.

Where believers are motivated to reach their friends, the movement grows. Here is where the Latin Pentecostals excel. People in many churches may recog-

nize cerebrally they should witness, but they are fearful and unmotivated. In contrast, the Pentecostals' teaching empowers them to witness.

A subpoint of this is the sociological fact of a critical mass being reached. If only 1% in a country are witnessing to their friends, that is a start. But when 20% are actively witnessing, there is exponential growth.

The flexibility of church structures helps. For instance, Assemblies of God churches train people through every possible means: seminaries, night schools, correspondence programs and day programs. So they have a surplus of available people to start new congregations. These lay leaders identify more with the common people than the priests or more traditional Protestant pastors.

### 4 Theological reasons.

Underlying it all is Latin evangelicals' very non-universalistic approach to the church's task. They firmly believe not everyone will be saved, and that people must be brought to personal repentance and faith.

Also, while evangelicals may criticize the Roman Catholic Church, it has succeeded in giving Latins a basic concept and reverence for God, Christ and Scripture.

Evangelical workers in Latin America do not have to start with a basic explanation of the Christian God, as missionaries do in Asia, for instance. There is a basic credulity (and I use the word in the positive sense). This is to the advantage of the Gospel. □

Moving from Latin American Roman Catholicism <sup>in Latin America -</sup> as at Medellin and Puebla - to the Pentecostal movement <sup>on that southern continent</sup>, there is like moving from massive Post-Constantinian Christianity back to the New Testament - from the world of <sup>in unity and</sup> ~~power~~ and political <sup>power</sup> and theological + social controversy back to a world where Jesus Christ ~~is~~ was risen and present, and God was very near and the Holy Spirit very active, a world of personal religion, and visions and ecstacy - and division.

<sup>That's Pentecostalism.</sup>  
 It all started in 1909 - with the Methodists in Chile, and a Methodist missionary named Willis C. Hoover. In Jan. <sup>1909</sup>, one of the members of his little Methodist congregation in Valparaiso <sup>(not Indiana)</sup> had a dream.

"Suddenly Jesus Christ appeared to him.. 'Wake up, I want to speak to you', he said. 'Yes, Lord', the startled man replied. 'Go to your <sup>[the missionary]</sup> pastor, and tell him to gather some of the most spiritual people of the congregation. They are to pray together every day. I intend to baptize them with tongues of fire.'" (Wagner. Look Out - p. 15).

Hoover, who had been restless with a feeling of spiritual stagnation in his church, was surprised - but decided to try it. <sup>That was January.</sup> By April the revival began. By October attendance was betw. 500 and 900. This was far greater growth



than the Methodist mission in Chile had ever seen before. You might have expected them to rejoice in that at least, <sup>(the growth of membership)</sup> regardless of what they thought of the reported visions. But as Peter Wagner describes it in his book, Look Out! The Pentecostals Are Coming (pp. 16-18), their reaction was just the opposite. "Open manifestations of spiritual power were offensive to many... local newspapers poked fun at these religious fanatics.. The Methodist Missionary Society in N.Y., hearing reports about "raising of hands, the baptism of fire, miracles of faith healing, visions, .. tongues, prophecies, predicting the date of Christ's return, falling down under the power of the Holy Spirit.." began to have doubts about its missionary, Hoover, <sup>who was let they said things happen,</sup> and before long the Methodists had forced him out. They seemed to have forgotten what happened under Wesley, when the Methodist movement began.

Hoover, quite understandably, simply started a new church, in 1910.

The Methodist Pentecostal Church, he called it. Its membership today is about 400,000. The old Methodist Ch. of Chile which threw him out has 20,000 (50 times smaller). They claimed ~~it was~~ <sup>that</sup> the dent behind the going on in Hoover's Pentecostal church. But as Wagner remarks, "Many of them have since wondered not least just on whose side the dent might really have been" (p. 18).

A little on both sides, perhaps. Pride, arrogance, ~~and~~ but essential orthodoxy on one side.

Enthusiasm <sup>and</sup> growth but abrasive divisiveness on the other. These Chilean Pentecostals have <sup>since their beginning in 1910.</sup> split into more than 20 schisms since, (World in Rev. - p. 229).



And lest you think Asia is still too far away, let me  
remind you that in the next 50 years, if present trends continue

Now let me move to Brazil.

In 1909, the same year, the Chilean night watchman saw his vision of Christ - the vision that led to the beginning of Chilean pentecostalism - ~~an~~ an <sup>obscure</sup> ~~unknown~~ Italian immigrant ~~in~~ in Chicago, <sup>named Louis Franceson,</sup> ~~with~~ who had received the gift of the Spirit and had spoken in tongues in the North Avenue Mission in that city felt a strong and unexpected call, direct from the Lord, he said, to go to South America. He had already started some new churches in Penna. + Calif. which grew into what is now the Christian Chch of North America (11,500 members in 1975). Even those of us who ~~sometimes~~ <sup>at times</sup> question ~~how directly the Lord~~ ~~other Christians~~ <sup>some charismatics, to</sup> ~~claims of~~ <sup>direct, immediate, unmistakable</sup> guidance ~~on the part of some charismatics~~ <sup>from the Lord</sup> will be hard put to it to ~~to~~ argue with Franceson's assertion that it was indeed the Lord who led him to leave his work in the U.S.A. for new work in Brazil. His Christian Chch of North America is now <sup>(1975)</sup> a denomination numbering 11,500 members <sup>(in 1975)</sup>. But the chch the Lord called him to plant in Brazil, the Christian Congregation of Brazil ~~with~~ has a million members, making it ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> one of the ~~the~~ <sup>three</sup> largest <sup>Protestant</sup> denominations in all Latin America.

He began his Latin American ministry in Sao Paulo, like Paul <sup>the Jew</sup>, who went first to the Jews in each city on his missionary journeys,



Francison, as an Italian went first to the Italians - in Buenos Aires, and ~~first~~ then <sup>in</sup> Sao Paulo. To his amazement he discovered that Sao Paulo had ~~an~~ 1,300,000 Italians. He found a number of them in a Presbyterian chh. there, and was invited to preach <sup>to these, Presbyterians</sup> ~~there~~ in Italian. But as with the Methodists in Chile, <sup>in the case of Wm.</sup> ~~with~~ <sup>Horner,</sup> the Presbyterians in Brazil ~~the~~ many were deeply moved by Francison's preaching, when he touched on the matter of speaking with tongues, as Peter Wagner reports (look out!, p 23), were very dubious and some were angry. Tensions increased, and the result was a church split. Those who left the Presbyterian chh. with Louis Francison became the first congregation of the Congregacao Cristo no Brasil. ~~The~~ <sup>From</sup> Presbyterian chh. in Sao Paulo ~~to~~ which they left has only a few hundred members. ~~The~~ <sup>The</sup> Pentecostal Congregations of Christ ~~number~~ grew so rapidly that they have built a number of chhes which seat over 5,000 members each - and the denomination as a whole has 600,000 adults, and a total membership of a million.

This seems to be the pattern in Latin America. ~~With~~  
Mainline churches, Methodist, Presbyterian, Baptist plant the seed faithfully,  
build the foundations soundly, carry on faithful missionary work for years,

Brazil Tent affl. ed. - 6,756,300 (began 1910)  
 Members - 2,944,674 (began with LMS South Am. - 1855 continuous work)  
 Wx Sur - 2,500,000

But God, who works in mysterious way, proceeds to grant the increase, <sup>and</sup> the church growth, to the Pentecostals. Don't jump to hasty generalizations, it is not <sup>so</sup> true in Asia, Africa, Europe or North America - at least not ~~there~~ yet - the ~~church~~ Pentecostals are growing in these other continents, <sup>(North America - Am. had fastest growth in USA & fastest growth in each of the 50 states).</sup> but have not <sup>yet at least</sup> so spectacularly eclipsed the other major Protestant bodies as they have in Latin America.

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Take the largest Protestant (evangelical) denomination south of the border - the Assemblies of God of Brazil. The same pattern is repeated there - they began not as Methodists as in Chile, or Presbyterians as with the Christian Congregation of Brazil - the Assemblies of God of Brazil began in a Baptist church.

In 1909 - that year 1909, you will remember, was a pivotal year in the history of Pentecostalism in Latin America -

[ In 1909 Louis Francescon felt his "strong compulsion to go to Lat. America - to Copacabana. In 1909 the Chilean night-watchman, <sup>in Thomas's Methodist ch. ch.</sup> had his vision of Jesus Christ -

and in 1909 two Swedes - Swedish immigrants in South Bend, Ind. at a small charismatic prayer meeting, received a "prophecy" telling them to go to "Pare". They had never heard of Pare - but went to the public library to look it up - and found that one of the states in Brazil is named Pare. They had ~~no~~ only enough money to go as far

as far as New York - but set out anyway - like those first two Moravian missionaries who <sup>in a way</sup> had started the whole modern missionary movement back in 1732 - by starting off from Germany, by way of Denmark, to ~~the~~ North America with only \$3 in their pockets. ( ). In the mysterious way that God sometimes uses to care for fools and saints, ~~in~~ in New York those two trusting Swedes - (Gunnar Vingren and Daniel Berg) - who had been told, when they got to NY to look for a certain man at a certain place, found the man they were looking for, and he gave them their exact fare by 3<sup>rd</sup> class freighter to a Brazilian port. They landed in tropical Brazil, penniless, in sweating in heavy woolen suits. A friendly Methodist pastor passed them on to a friendly Baptist pastor whose church they <sup>soon</sup> split <sup>when they began to preach in Portuguese + speak in tongues - some liked it, some didn't but most of the congreg. didn't and the church split.</sup> - There's no ignoring the hard fact that for all their virtues, Latin America's pentecostals have been the most fractious and divisive of the continent's Christian bodies.

A minority of the Baptist congregation in Belem followed Vingren and Berg out of the church and formed their own worshipping fellowship, which, as we have seen has grown since 1910 into the largest Protestant denomination in all of Latin America - and, in fact, the largest Protestant denomination in the 3<sup>rd</sup> world. (The Assemblies of God of Brazil).



As these stories of Pentecostal beginnings show, the rise of Pentecostalism anywhere presents some difficulties to church historians. Their own histories - the Pentecostal histories of their churches - are largely anecdotal, not analytic. They are too busy preaching and singing the Lord's praises to write extended histories. And how does a historian interpret the stories. When a Pentecostal says "The Lord told me to go to Latin America" - does he mean by word, or by vision, or by dream, or by some subjectively felt impulse, and how can the professional historian be sure that it was really the Lord who told him to go, ~~or that it~~ rather than the pioneering Pentecostal missionary's own strongly and sincerely held feeling of conviction. <sup>Or how can we be sure it wasn't</sup> ~~a~~ just a dream which may or may not <sup>have come</sup> from the Lord.

Another problem is Pentecostal statistics. Church statistics are always notoriously "soft" statistics - that is, a little vague and poorly recorded. Pentecostal statistics are even more so. Fast-growing churches are too busy growing to spend time recording, ~~and~~ ~~But at least there's no question that the~~ ~~Pentecostals~~ which is why it is difficult to get a precise fix on just how fast they are growing. For example: W. R. Reed, who has collaborated on the best church-growth studies in Brazil, has had to jump <sup>and</sup> bewilderingly back and forth <sub>up and down</sub> in his estimates of the growth of the Assemblies of God, just since 1964.

In 1964 (in *New Patterns of Church Growth in Brazil*) he said 950,000 communicants  
 In 1967 he revised the figure to 1,400,000  
 In 1970, to bring the figure into line with prot. statistics, he dropped it to 746,400

Meantime the Assemblies of God themselves were claiming  
 2,057,000 baptized members  
 plus 721,000 other adult members  
 Total - 2,783,000

The new World Christian Encyclopedia reports (1950) 2,783,000 adults and total effl. - 4,000,000.  
 The denomination itself reports, in 1978 3.1 million adult ch. members + 2.5 mill. adherents = 5,600,000.

But regardless of the unsatisfying nature of chch statistics, they are, as Tim Roper Schutz, of the Protestant monastic order at Taizé is quoted as saying - ~~Statistics are~~ "signs from God". <sup>"Statistics are signs from God"</sup> (Wald for Enc., p. 123), & these "signs from God" in Latin America bid us take the Pentecostals very seriously -

~~A recent article (1977) by Dayton Roberts (L.A. Evangelist, March/Apr. 1977, p. 10f.)~~

Prot  
 1900 - 1,500,000  
 1950 - 5 M.  
 1990 - 38,000,000  
 now 75% Pentecostal

In 1900 there were ~~less than 1,000,000~~ <sup>only about 1,500,000</sup> Protestant Christians in Latin America, virtually none of them Pentecostal (Wald Enc., p. 782 - cf. Roberts, 100,000 Prot. ch. mem.) [and less than 100,000 baptized adult members (Roberts, Lat. Am. Ev., March/Apr. 1977, p. 10)]. In the early 1950s, half a century later, there were ~~about 5~~ <sup>perhaps 2 million</sup> million, ~~less than~~ <sup>less than</sup> half of whom were Pentecostal, but Pentecostals were beginning to explode, as Mackey pointed out. By the mid-60s, - the first critical chch growth study (by Wm. Reed, H. Johnson + Victor Montemero, *Latin America Ch. Growth*, 1969) discovered that there were more than 10 million Protestant chs, & that 2 out of every 3 were Pentecostal. Today, out of some ~~32~~ <sup>35</sup> million Protestants in Latin America -

3 out of every four Protestants (75%)  
about ~~3/4~~ perhaps as many as <sup>4/5</sup> are Pentecostal,

The greatest strength of the Pentecostals is in Brazil, ~~Mexico~~ Chile and ~~Chile~~ Mexico (Roberts), and they are the largest grouping also in Argentina, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Panama, El Salvador and Honduras as well.

Socio-religious studies show, says Dayton Roberts of Costa Rica, that traditional "Pentecostalism" finds its greatest appeal among the less privileged masses of working peoples, offering them a dimension of supernatural reality in their Christian experience they had failed to find in the superstitions of their previous folk religion. But it has not remained statically lower class. "Conversion, liberation from degrading vices, education - these have provided an upward social mobility of considerable impact." (L. Am. Ev., p. 11) <sup>Rev. Apr. 1977,</sup>

Generally speaking there are three types of charismatic: ① the traditional Pentecostals, ② the "renewed" or charismatic Protestants in the mainline churches, and ③ the charismatic Catholics. In Latin America, some Pentecostals, says Roberts, "would doubtless prefer to be labeled 'charismatic', a term that seems to play down the 'corporeal' aspect of the Pentecostal experience in favor of the more inward gifts of the spirit. As a matter of fact, many of the traditional Pentecostal groups that may have started with a strong emphasis on 'gloriosa' have moved



to a stage where tongues is no longer the major distinctive of their posture. One survey shows that 60% of the pastors in the old Methodist Pentec. Ch. of Chile have never spoken in tongues. "The reality of their faith is reflected more in their type of worship and evangelism, sometimes blurring the line of distinction between them [i.e. "Pentecostals"] and 'renewed' Protestants and the charismatic Catholics." (Roberts)

To quote Wagner again, "It is more a dynamic mood than a crystallized theology [this Pentecostalism]. You can tell the Pentecostals more by what they do than by what they teach. Not all Pentecostals speak in tongues, but none forbid speaking in tongues... It might be easier than we think for non-Pentecostal churches to 'Pentecostalize' themselves without doctrinal compromise. In other words, non-Pentecostals might do well to seriously to consider the possibility of behaving more like Pentecostals even if they do not choose to believe like them."

"In any case," concludes Roberts, "the Pentecostal majority [in Latin America] is a fact of life <sup>(which)</sup> the other fourth of the Protestant community cannot ignore... The Pentecostals are here to stay and are valued members of the Body of Christ..."

① Wagner, p. 36, citing Reed, Munterross + H. Johnson, Latin American Ch. Growth, Erdman, 1969, p. 37).

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Orlando Costas sums up <sup>an</sup> his analysis of the Pentecostals south of the border in 6 pros, and 5 cons (Lat. Am. Evangelist. March/Apr. 1977, p. 106.)

The pros: the six strengths of the movement:

- ① Their Christ-centeredness. Contrary to traditional Pentecostalism whose theology by & large has been Spirit-centered, the Latin charismatics base their concept of <sup>the</sup> Spirit & His gifts on Christ Himself.
- ② Their use of God's word. Like the Reformers, they take the Bible away from the priests and open it to the laity.
- ③ Their spirituality of "love". Unlike some Pentecostals who emphasize a spirituality of "power" - theirs is a spirituality of love, not emphasizing power to speak in tongues or cast out demons, but to give themselves to others without counting the cost.
- ④ Their fellowship in the church. To the charismatic, the chh is primarily a fellowship, not a tool for organization.
- ⑤ The ecumenicity of their experience. Unlike traditional ecumenicity which is an ecumenicity of institutions, an organization for chh union; the ecumenicity of the charismatics is personal & informal, open to all who have in common the experience of the Spirit.
- ⑥ Evangelism as Disciple-making. Their evangelism is not directed just to the goal of winning people to Christ, but to forming converts into "authentic followers of Christ". They do not divorce the offers of the Gospel from its demands.

The cons: but there are <sup>five</sup> problem areas in the movement: -

- ① Middle-class orientation. Though strong among workers - its socio-political orientation is middle class (family & chh centered) not concerned about structure
- ② Neglect of Christ's Humanity - "emphasizing his lordship, forgetting his servanthood."
- ③ Authority of Scripture - the danger of giving a higher authority to immediate revelations from the Spirit than to the clear teaching of Scripture.
- ④ Spirituality without works. A tendency to fail to demonstrate the efficacy of spiritual power in concrete situations.
- ⑤ Vertical pastoral authority. Note "how a movement strongly critical of the contemporary church's institutional imprisonment, falls prey itself to a vertical pastoral structure, with a hierarchical authority that passes down from Christ to the shepherds, to their disciples and their disciples' disciples. The word they use is "going together" or "subjugation" - highly authoritarian and in effect denying the freedom of the Spirit of which they boast.



The Pentecostals and charismatic movement is so important in Latin America, let me give you a short pattern of analysis to help in understanding it. Pentecostals ~~are~~ no more come in one pattern than the older denominations - Presbyterians, Methodists, Lutherans, Anglicans are different but they belong to one major chch classification: traditional Protestant, or mainline. So also <sup>L.A.</sup> Pentecostals & charismatics - they belong in one major category, but they are very different. <sup>So here</sup> ~~This~~ is one classification used in Latin America to describe them in - 6 categories, or groupings, in 2 groups of 3.

A. Traditional Pentecostal. Authoritarian structure; lay leadership.

1. Old autochthonous (self-governing) - This group includes the earliest, and largest groups - like Chile's Methodist Pentecostals, & Assemblies of God Brazil. Their worship is lush, but controlled now by their own growing traditions - dancing in the aisles, but stewards to see it does not get out of hand. They are anti-political, and do not cooperate locally with other denominations, but are ecumenically cooperative internationally. <sup>Chile WCC</sup>

2. U.S. & European Imported - This group follows U.S. + European denominational patterns - Chh of God; Four-Square Gospel Chh. Locally, rarely cooperate with other evangelicals. Strict standards for membership, <sup>annual</sup> meetings; limited social action.

3. Recent autochthonous. Recent breakaways from the first two groups, & from Nazarenes. (important for illiterates with lots of tents.) Meet every single night of the week. <sup>Now names:</sup> Rose of Sharon Pentecostal; Primavera de Paz (Guat.)



B. Charismatics

(middle class)

4. Modern Charismatic - quite different from the above: less emphasis on tongues, <sup>strong</sup> Bible study + emphasis on Christ-centeredness (H.S. never separated from Christ)

like the traditional Pentecostals, they question all church structures, but unlike the traditional Pentecostals they are less leader-centered, less authoritarian and emphasize collegiality in administration. Plymouth Brethren influence is strong, with the best known evangelist, Juan Carlos Artiz, moved from the Plymouth Brethren to the Assembly of God Church, Argentina - and was expelled by the Assemblies for questioning that church's structure + authority. He is even willing to work with Catholic charismatics - who belong to the next group.

5. Traditional Church Charismatics - both Catholic & Protestant. Very strong among Mennonites, and some of the older Faith Mission boards, like the Latin American Mission. Accept tongues, but do not regard this as indispensable.

(middle class)  
(~~middle class~~)

Tend to be better educated. In education: 2, 4 & 5 are more middle class  
1, 3 are lower class.

6. Miscellaneous

Perhaps L.A. Pentecostalism is best understood as a renewal movement leading Christians from a prevailing nominal Christianity to personal, active Xty.

See next page

- ② // Its major characteristic is not really <sup>an</sup> emotionalism of gifts and miracles, but lay evangelism
- ① // and a complete conviction in the reality of the supernatural - that life has more than a this-worldly dimension.

Two fundamental

(26)

~~These~~ 2 characteristics are, I believe, the main spring of its strength.

~~What makes the Pentecostal churches so attractive to Latin Americans that they are joining them churches by the millions. Many reasons have been suggested. I will list only a few:~~

1. <sup>Its</sup> Christ-centeredness. Unlike tradition - not Spirit-centered but Christ-centered.

1. ~~There~~ <sup>Its</sup> ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup> ~~an~~ <sup>is</sup> attraction to crowds, perhaps, in Latin America - and the biggest churches are almost always pentecostal - seating 5 to 10,000.

2. <sup>Its</sup> ~~There~~ <sup>is</sup> ~~an~~ <sup>is</sup> emotionalism. For the poor, there are few times of freedom to rejoice, to laugh & shout and sing, in a way that most traditional churches seem to frown on. They like <sup>its</sup> the "wise level" of Pentecostal worship. "Its warmth, its music, its rhythm and clapping. Even its preaching style is simpler, more dramatic, more direct. In the Pentecostal," ~~she~~ writes Roberts, "it must at least be said that it is fun to go to church."

①

1. <sup>Its</sup> ~~There~~ <sup>is</sup> ~~an~~ <sup>is</sup> unquestioning supernaturalism. It has sometimes been asked

by visiting North American theologians, why <sup>do</sup> the Pentecostals and not the liberation theologians attract the poor and the common people, when it is the liberation theologians and not the Pentecostals who make such a point of "theology for the poor." Perhaps the reason is simply that a "theology for the poor" is essentially patronizing, and the poor instinctively react against it. If liberation theologians were poorer - and their theology a theology of instead of for the poor, they might be competitive in Latin America outside the classrooms - but so far

in a hard and unjust world, Pentecostalism seems to offer more freedom of worship and expression, at least in church, and more hope for the future, if not in this world then in the next, than the more politically oriented and more upper class Theologies of the seminaries. If that is escapism, as a Marxist would call it - well ~~it is~~ it is, in a way. But the Marxists have always underestimated the revolutionary impact of a Christian faith that has always had its home in two worlds - this one, and the next, - and whose eternal hope is not in this one but the next. Perhaps that is another reason for Pentecostal appeal in the midst of injustice in Lat. America.

Some call it "body life" - which is the religious counterpart of social activism.  
 2. Its activism. Pentecostals ~~are not so~~ are not so

politically active as some would have them be - at least as churches.

But they are far more religiously active than most of their counterparts in Catholicism or Protestantism, for Pentecostalism is essentially a lay movement here.

("Body life" is the active life of the <sup>members of the</sup> Body of Christ, ~~the~~ the Church. It is a term popularized by a non-Pentecostal.)

<sup>(i.e. the emphasis on laity)</sup> This becomes strikingly apparent in Peter Wagner's description of the Brazil for Christ Church, in Sao Paulo, Brazil. The secret of Pentecostal growth is an active laity - laymen & laywomen active in evangelism. The whole church becomes involved.



The Brazil for Christ Chh in Sao Paulo, is led by one of the best known Pentecostal leaders in the world, Manuel de Melo.

It has recently completed construction of its main sanctuary - a huge building which seats 25,000 worshippers. de Melo calls it "the biggest church in the world" - and it probably is - <sup>but not any more. (Korea) - thh perhaps do chh bldg. seats more than any other.</sup> ~~But visit it on a Sunday morning~~ <sup>although not the biggest congregation.</sup>

Wagner visited the old sanctuary - which sat 5,000, on a Sunday morning - with its mile and a half of pews - and found only 100 people there.

Where are the 5,000? "The five thousand," says Wagner, "meet on Thursday and Saturday nights, [and] on Sunday are out where active Christians are supposed to be, according to Manuel de Melo. They are back in their neighborhoods winning new people to Christ and gathering them together in daughter churches... In the capital area of Sao Paulo alone a total of 1,496 new churches and congregations have been planted by enthusiastic members of the Brazil for Christ Church.

This explains why Pentecostals need fewer outside missionaries.

In 1970 - Latin America's non-Pentecostals had 90% of the missionaries, but only 37% of the members, while Pentecostals had 10% of the missionaries "with a whopping 63% of the members" (Wagner, <sup>p. 85</sup> citing Latin American Ch. Growth, p. 57)

5. Concern for the immediate needs of the poor. Pentecostals are accused of lack of social concern in Latin America. It is true that they do not give much thought to the great, overarching structures of society. The poor rarely do. But they know where the poor hurt most - and it is there that ~~they~~ their compassion is evident and most effective. Their churches are open to the sick, and they pray for them, and many are healed. Most can't afford a hospital anyway.

There are some dramatic cases of faith healing recorded in Peter Wagner's book Look Out. The Pentecostals are Coming, chap. 8, pp. 121 ff. - and if you read that chapter, remember that Wagner was noted in Latin America when he was a missionary there, for his nationally circulated articles against faith healing. (p. 123). A Pentecostal preacher put it this way: -  
 "Christ healed spiritually and physically... He died to save; He lives to heal."  
 (Wagner, Look Out, p. 146).

6. Their parameters of social concern.

Criticisms of the Pentecostals

① Lack of social activism

The best critical studies by sociologists of the Pentecostal movement in Latin America are:

Christen Laline, Harvest of the Masses - on Chilean Pentecostalism, <sup>1969</sup> ~~not~~ a WCC publication  
Emilio Willems, Follower of the New Faith (Nashville: Vanderbilt, 1967).

The first is most appreciative of the Pentecostals, but as might be expected of a WCC commissioned study in 1969, just after the revolutionary 1968 Conference on Church and Society, he pounds away at ~~the~~ Pentecostal lack of social concern and involvement in favor of an emphasis on personal, moral reform.

"Pentecostalism teaches its initiates withdrawal and passivity in socio-political matters, limited only by the commandment to be submissive to authority... These components make it in the last analysis a force for order rather than an element of progress, a defender of the status quo and not a promoter of change."  
(Laline, p. 145).

The other study, by the Vanderbilt Univ. sociologist, is more independent and more positive. Taking Brazil and Chile as examples, he demonstrates that the growth of the Pentecostals, has in fact given them <sup>actual</sup> ~~some~~ social and political clout. than the slower-growing but more articulate activists of the ~~mainline~~ universities and seminaries. But it is true that they are quite consciously non-political and conservative. As Laline puts it, "they put



great emphasis on cleaning up ~~the~~<sup>one's</sup> personal ~~life~~ life, [but] do not seem equally concerned about cleaning up the world around them." (Wagner, p. 140)

This may be indeed a lack of wholeness in their gospel, but it is not necessarily bad, as Dean Kelley pointed out a few years ago, in ~~What Makes~~<sup>Why</sup> Conservative Churches<sup>Are</sup> Growing (1972). Pentecostals believe firmly in the priority of the ultimate spiritual dimension of life over the immediate physical dimension. (Wagner, p. 141).

Donald Palmer, of Trinity Div. School, writing a Ph.D. Thesis on The Growth of the Pentecostal Churches in Colombia (1972) asked a cross section of pastors the question "Do you believe that the Evangelical church ought to concern itself more with the social problems of the country and declare itself with respect to these problems?". Non-Pentecostal pastors replied "Yes". But the pastors of the United Pentecostal denomination there, which is only 12 years old but already outnumbers the 126 year-old Presb. Ch. of Colombia 95,000 members to 21,000, becoming in the process the largest Protestant denomination in the country, all said "No" - no political involvement.

(Compare chh membership in Colombia)

United Pentecostal, Colombia (1970)	95,000
Four Square Gospel (1942)	70,000
7 <sup>th</sup> Day Adventist (1921)	60,000
Presbyterian (1856)	21,000.

The United Pentecostal pastors not only opposed social issue involvement, they oppose Christian connection with organized athletics, politics or labor unions. Yet they are a working class church. It is almost as if they cared nothing for justice - they are too concerned with petty issues. As ~~Wayner~~<sup>Palmer</sup> reports - women may not cut their hair; members may not attend dances, theaters, soccer matches. Television, radio and secular music are considered worldly. Their club Manual ~~was~~ puts it very bluntly. "We warn all of our believers to abstain from any of these practices in the interest of spiritual growth and the soon coming of our Lord" (cited by Palmer, quoted by Wayner, p. 143).

But that is an extreme case. In general, the Pentecostal position is more balanced - but priorities are very clearly defined. Wayner says, "Intuitively Pentecostals understand that their resources are limited, and that decisions as to the degree of social involvement boil down ultimately to a matter of priorities". And to them, "There is nothing ~~so~~ as important as getting <sup>people's</sup> [men's] hearts right with God. The center must be put right before the periphery can be corrected..." (Wayner, p. 144 - the last quotation from Melvin Hodges, CA Sec. for Adv. of God, 'A Pentecostal's View of Mission Strategy, IRM, July 1968, p. 309)

strive to interpret any Catholic renewal as a tactical maneuver or at best as only a superficial change: 'Rome changes not.'"<sup>22</sup>

A comparison of the Canon Law published in 1917 with the 1983 edition will show that in spite of modifications (use of the vernacular, etc.), Rome has in fact not changed. Even on the practical level, the "disappearance of the most eye-catching differences within folk-Catholicism,"<sup>23</sup> which Bonino claims has already happened, has in fact not happened. Only if one grants that Bonino is correct in asserting that the Catholic Church has changed profoundly can one accept his conclusion: "Protestant churches stand before a challenging fact of Catholic renewal, in relation to which our artificial divisions are a scandal."<sup>24</sup>

Padilla, Castro, and Theo Tschuy, former secretary of the WCC Commission on Inter-Church Aid for Latin America, agree with Bonino. Padilla wrote recently that for the Protestant Church in Latin America, "the renewal of Roman Catholicism has outdated its strictly 'Protestant' role."<sup>25</sup> Castro believes, "Today's Catholicism is fundamentally different from that which the first Protestant missionaries encountered."<sup>26</sup> This point of view naturally makes him and others who share it very open to dialogue and even active cooperation with the Roman Catholic Church. Costas quotes de Santa Ana approvingly: "Protestants and Catholics must increasingly seek ways to witness jointly to their common faith."<sup>27</sup> Tschuy wrote in 1969, "The Vatican Council has sprung the fetters of the past. Christians on both sides of the trench have grasped that they belong to the same Church of Christ."<sup>28</sup> He celebrates the current openness to Rome and ascribes past and present trep*ed*ation on the part of those who



# The Evangelical Groundswell in Latin America

GUILLERMO COOK

*Tongues of Fire: The Explosion of Protestantism in Latin America.*  
By David Martin. Blackwell, 352 pp., \$29.95.

*Is Latin America Turning Protestant? The Politics of Evangelical Growth.*  
By David Stoll. University of California Press, 399 pp., \$24.95.

*Crisis in Latin America: An Evangelical Perspective.*  
By Emilio A. Núñez C. and William D. Taylor. Moody Press, 439 pp., \$19.95.

THESE THREE BOOKS share a common interest in Latin American Protestantism. The first two analyze its recent explosive growth, though from quite different perspectives. David Martin, the British author of *A General Theory of Secularization*, sets out to demonstrate grand patterns in religious movements, with a functionalist's passion for social equilibrium. David Stoll, a graduate student in anthropology and the author of a critical study of the Wycliffe Bible Translators, focuses more specifically on grass-roots religious phenomena and presents a structuralist's critique. Martin devotes less space to Central America—a principal focus of Stoll's study—than to the larger nations in the region. While Martin centers more specifically on Pentecostalism, Stoll's concern is the entire evangelical movement. Martin's main sources are the enormous pool of available research on Latin American religious phenomena, while Stoll's study relies to a great extent on his own field research and on unpublished documents. Martin's approach is deductive, Stoll's more inductive. Yet despite their different approaches, their conclu-

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sions come close at one key point (a point further explored by Emilio Núñez and William Taylor): the latent capacity for critical social awareness that resides in Latin American Protestantism.

For Martin, the growth of Pentecostalism in Latin America is a logical extension of the centuries-old clash of two imperial visions, the result of which are the Hispanic and English civilizations. Today's heirs of the Roman hierarchical tradition are confronted again—successfully, Martin believes—by Anglo-style voluntarism with its legacy of popular dissent. Meanwhile, an authoritarian Catholic Church finds it increasingly difficult to compete with egalitarian social ideals and with the wide variety of choices Protestantism offers. It has attempted three defensive strategies with ambiguous results: 1) church-state alignment and religious intolerance, 2) political alignments and indoctrination (Catholic Action and Christian Democracy), and 3) liberation theology and the base communities.

In his introductory chapters Martin traces through Northern Europe and North and South America the three overlapping waves of Protestant cultural revolution—Puritanism, Methodism (the Evangelical Revival) and Pentecostalism. These movements have arisen more or less at the periphery of the establishment. Surveying Latin America in four brief chapters, Martin argues for the role of early Methodism as a paradigm for understanding the social function of Pentecostalism as it takes root in Latin countries. He then discusses the social and religious implications of Pentecostal "reformations": spiritual communications (tongues and healings—vehicles of liberation within an oral tradition), conversions (personal and familial), and evolving attitudes toward economic and political involvement.

In Europe voluntarism stagnated and died, but it flowered in North America. The growth of Protestantism in Latin America is in part a function of the powerful and religiously motivated presence

of the United States, Britain's imperial successor. The author calls this the "Americanization of Latin American religion"—a fact which, he rightly points out, is resented by many Latin Americans. The other side of the coin is the creative "Latinamericanization of American religion." The role and potential of Pentecostalism is a function of both its past and present roots. Its origins lie in a differentiated society, where religion operated primarily at the level of culture. As it became rooted in a nondifferentiated world where voluntarism threatens the entire social order, Pentecostalism has had to adapt. While it allows for a variety of options *ad intra*, it guards itself from a hostile environment by a non-Methodist passivity and acceptance of the status quo.

Yet, says Martin, the transformational potential of the Pentecostal "social strike *from* society" (vs. the Marxist "strike *against* society") should not be underestimated. As they increase in numbers and maturity Pentecostals will become more secure and perhaps more aware of their social responsibilities. The author points out (as does Stoll) that while "sophisticated" Protestants may be more concerned *about* the poor, grass-roots Pentecostals are more successful *with* the poor. He reminds us that many of the ideals—women's rights, world peace, rejection of capital punishment—that "radical" groups espouse today were incubated within the closed confines of religious "sects" like the Bohemian Brethren, Mennonites, Quakers and Swedenborgians. These observations merit serious consideration.

Nonetheless there is a serious flaw in Martin's methodology. Broadly generalized models of history, à la Spengler or Toynbee, inevitably run into contradictions. Such is the case here. To paint the English and Iberian worldviews in such black-and-white colors smacks of the same sort of cultural imperialism the author decries. And as Martin himself admits, "voluntarism" has also been coercive, as has been the case with U.S. deal-



ings with oppressed peoples in Latin America and even within its own borders. Further, his model is too pat. Voluntarism is not an Anglo monopoly. The underside of Roman Catholic history is peppered with seditious sects that appeared long before the Protestant Reformation. The most recent instance of Hispanic voluntarism is the Catholic base communities—which the author mentions only once, and in a patronizing way. To dismiss them, as he does, as “incipiently Protestant . . . instruments” of the Catholic Church which also “threaten its structure” is to miss the point entirely. The base communities also present a serious challenge to Protestant authoritarianism and are a threat to U.S. hegemony. At times Martin gives the impression of trying to shoehorn diverse religious experiences—and the complexity of Latin America, the English Caribbean, South Korea and South Africa—into one neat package.

Martin’s approach to social conflict is typical of a functionalist analysis: systemic ills are seen more as dysfunctions to be decried and restored to proper balance than as fundamental ills to be redressed. This may explain why a pivotal event such as the 1932 peasant insurgency in El Salvador is mentioned only as it affected the Pentecostal churches’ “prosperity.” He takes a similar approach to the “electronic church.” In like manner, in discussing Protestant growth in Guatemala, he makes only passing reference to Protestant political polarization and to the endemic violence there. Again, in describing socioeconomic changes affecting Ecuadoran Quechuas as a result of Protestant missions, Martin barely alludes to Catholic Bishop Leonidas Proaño’s hard-won agrarian reform which made the changes possible. Neither does he mention the ambiguous role of North American missions and relief agencies such as World Vision, which Stoll discusses in some detail.

Martin’s overreliance on the research of others and on interviews with North American personnel has left him open to glaring factual errors and unfortunate omissions. The Latin American Mission, to which he attributes certain actions in Guatemala, does not even operate in that country. His information on dissident religious movements is incomplete and on occasion incorrect and simplistic. For

example, he falsely ties the *Confraternidad Evangélica* of Guatemala to the guerrillas. To claim such a relationship is irresponsible, because it imperils lives. And at least at one point his logic fails him: the reversal from the highly mediated hierarchical church to a nonmediated Pentecostal “cell” requires, he says, the “unequivocal leadership” of a pastor, of “folds and safe enclosures.” Are pastors and folds not mediations? Throughout Latin America, certain Protestant ministries are becoming, to quote a Spanish saying, “more popish than the pope.” All of this notwithstanding, I suspect that Martin’s basic conclusion regarding the transformational potential in Pentecostalism may turn out to be entirely valid.

**D**AVID STOLL challenges the fundamentalist stereotypes of both the left and the right. Though an avowed nonbeliever, he has a keen understanding of the Protestant evangelical ethos. A longtime supporter of justice causes, he can be as critical of liberation theology and of liberal stereotypes as of the shibboleths of the religious right. And lest conservatives take too much comfort in his predictions about Protestant ascendancy in Latin America, he suggests that the evangelicalism that is on the horizon may become more socially involved than its present image would indicate. He handles his topic with a good ear for the apt statement and with tongue-in-cheek irony, though at times he lapses into glibness.

Stoll has two objectives. First, he says, “for readers alarmed by evangelical growth, I want to provide a sense of its open-ended nature.” Evangelicalism, he insists, “is a generator of social change

whose direction is not predestined.” To blame this growth on right-wing religious groups and U.S. imperialism—as many do—implies, he says, a profound distrust of the poor and of their ability to “turn an imported religion to their own purposes.”

When he began his research, Stoll suspected that the conspiracy theory as the explanation of Protestant growth was exaggerated. The Iran-contra scandal disabused him. His second objective speaks to this issue. “For evangelicals, I wish to dramatize the danger of allowing their missions to be harnessed to United States militarism by the religious right.” Accordingly, the initial chapters of Stoll’s work deal with the invasion of the sects and with the Catholic Church’s approaches to the various threats to its ancient hegemony—the Protestant onslaught in particular.

Stoll devotes almost half the book to a carefully nuanced discussion of the ideology, activities and historical context of the Protestant movements that have settled in Latin America, right up to the coming of the religious right. His typologies are helpful in untangling a complex maze of interrelationships. In three of his chapters he presents case studies of Protestantism in Central America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua) and Ecuador (the role of World Vision). His conclusion—a reinterpretation of “the invasion of the sects as an Evangelical Awakening”—is bound to raise hackles on both sides of the issue. It is here that Stoll states the questions that have dogged him throughout his research: “Why should a religion which appears to work against the interests of the people help them in their struggle for survival?” Why is conservative Protestantism more successful at attracting the masses than a theology that is so explicitly concerned for the liberation of the masses?

Stoll argues that the impressive Protestant growth, with allowances made for the “revolving door effect,” cannot be ascribed entirely to the right-wing sects. The reasons are more complex. He hints strongly that the growing conservatism of Rome may be partly to blame, as Catholics find less and less room in their church for freedom of the spirit. Stoll further insists that “evangelicals provided an ideology, not just of political resignation, as so often noted, but of personal improvement.” Indeed, evangelical conversion may have become for the masses a more peaceful outlet for revolutionary fervor than the political message of libera-



tion. While liberation theology has raised people's consciousness, it has also raised expectations beyond its proponents' capacity to deliver. Meanwhile, Pentecostal churches and Protestant relief agencies are delivering more immediate material results without setting off unmanageable class and ethnic confrontations. Tactical errors by the insurgents in Guatemala during José Efraín Ríos Montt's rule drove into the arms of right-wing churches entire Mayan villages that had first sought guerrilla protection from the army.

Stoll's analysis is given more weight by a study recently issued by CEDI, a Brazilian ecumenical documentation and information center, which found that Catholic base community members in that country are joining Pentecostal churches in large numbers. Pentecostalism, the refuge of the masses? Perhaps, but Stoll hints that these new converts may not have entirely forsaken their radical awareness—and as Protestant growth collides with increasing impoverishment, more opportunities for radicalization arise. The gospel, defined "in terms of social justice as well as personal salvation, has the potential to appeal to the millions of evangelicals whose economic position is deteriorating." Indeed, grass-roots Protestant congregations, says Stoll, may be going through the same process of awareness-raising as did the Catholic base communities in the '50s.

There are things to quarrel with in Stoll's book. In dealing with Nicaragua, for example, he gives the same weight to all his sources, apparently without exercising "ideological suspicion." He strives to achieve objectivity by balancing off the consistent brutality of the right with the occasional excesses of the left. Moreover, his faith in the power of "enlightened self-interest" to transform individualistic autocrats into democrats has little substance. To his credit, Stoll acknowledges that he has spent less time studying radical Christian movements than he has conservative Christianity. His case for the existence of a more "open-ended" evangelicalism would have been stronger had he studied the scores of struggling grass-roots agencies that model themselves on the Radical Reformation. While he devotes more space to the Catholic base communities than does Martin, he is seemingly unaware of their influence on grass-roots Protestantism;

nor does he understand their symbiotic relationship to liberation theology. As a telling instance of his misinformation, he calls the Catholic base communities "ecclesiastical"—i.e., institutional—rather than ecclesial—i.e., churchly in nature despite contrary ecclesiastical strictures.

Stoll's comment that "liberation theology may be better at filling faculties, bookshelves, and graves than churches" no doubt will be celebrated by the enemies of that movement. But it is both callow and unfair, implying that this theology is primarily academic and elitist (though he may be partly right if he is

referring primarily to a handful of dilettantish Protestants). If liberation theology were merely a classroom exercise, it would be no threat to the powers of church and state. Graves have been filled wherever downtrodden people have cried "Enough!" Liberation theology is more a product of this outcry than its cause. And because "the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church," there is also an underground evangelical church that is growing quantitatively. Neither Stoll nor Martin seems to be aware of this fact. To be sure, the numerical growth of Latin American Protestantism also builds upon the sacrifice of some early martyrs at the hands of Roman Catholics—an ugly chapter in Latin American history which could repeat itself in some fanatical enclaves.

Not all growth, however, should be celebrated. Nor is numerical success, as both Martin and Stoll seem to imply, the only criterion for assessing the impact of Protestantism on Latin American society. Ecclesiastical "poaching," the "revolving door effect," raises questions about the extent of that growth. There are also theological grounds for questioning numerical increase which is built upon a distorted understanding of the kingdom of God.

The alarming growth of heretical "sects" (a term I use cautiously) also concerns responsible evangelicals. Indeed, rapid, superficial growth may backfire. In Costa Rica there is reliable evidence of recent retrenchment following a period of growth, with defections even to Catholicism.

MY OBJECTIONS notwithstanding, I find a number of Stoll's conclusions to be substantially correct. Let me mention a few. Liberal institutions, stuck in their ivory towers, largely overlook the fact that the churches they lionize in Latin America—Protestant congregations that express their solidarity with the poor—are mainly evangelical in theology. It is not without significance that Stoll has found most of his cases of evangelical participation in social transformation in regions such as Central America, the Andean republics, Brazil and Chile, where conservative churches are strong, and not in those countries where liberal denominations are active.

Stoll makes reference to "the immense social power in those praying masses of believers." As early as 1980, Brazilian Marxist sociologist Carlos Rodrigues-Brandao, after in-depth field research, pointed out (in *Os Deuses do Povo*, or "The Gods of the People") the latent revolutionary potential in "small sect" Pentecostalism. This movement of "the poor of the earth," he suggested, was perhaps better prepared than the Catholic base communities to confront the evils of society because Pentecostals see themselves as engaged in a holy war, and are buoyed by a hope of "a final struggle that will recreate a social order." When Pentecostals become more politically aware, they can become a potent force for change. "Their active belief in supernatural forces is not escapism, but a source of hope in their struggle to change their environment." Brandao argues cogently that popular religion, of whatever kind, is not an apolitical phenomenon. "In its own way, it is a grassroots struggle to regain a degree of freedom from the domination of more structured religious forms."

On the basis of both firsthand observation and reputable sociological studies, Stoll, along with Martin, has found little evidence of upward social mobility among the rank and file of grass-roots evangelicalism. Whatever upward pull there may have been in the past is being



canceled out by Protestant inroads among the impoverished masses. Quoting Lalive d'Epina's groundbreaking study of Chilean Pentecostalism, Stoll notes that the focus of Protestant growth and social involvement is the family, whereas Marxism focuses on the workplace. To the extent that the base communities fit into the latter model, this insight may explain a fact that has long troubled me: the short "shelf-life" of the base communities, compared to the continuity and numerical growth of Protestant congregations. When they seem to achieve the goals of their struggle, or when the issues become fuzzy during periods of political "distention" and "democratization," the base communities often experience a crisis of identity. On the other hand, the family orientation of evangelical churches makes for long-term stability and provides linkages for growth throughout extended family networks. I have written elsewhere on the Catholic base communities as the hope of the church. What I could not foresee is that the major beneficiaries of their vision of social transformation may turn out to be grass-roots Protestant churches and a new breed of Protestant churches and a new breed of ecumenical base communities. Their apologists have always insisted that the base communities were expendable: they should die and be resurrected as a new church of the poor. Is it conceivable that Pentecostal congregations will become a part of this new church, working toward the transformation of Latin America? Stoll asks, "Could the surprising evangelical groundswell affect the course of events in Latin America?" It is too early to make a definitive judgment.

Both Stoll and Martin are fairly bullish on evangelicalism/Pentecostalism. But the movement's potential for social transformation will be achieved to the degree in which it allows itself to be leavened by base-church values. There are faint signs of hope throughout evangelicalism. A recent consultation convened by an institution hostile to liberation theology produced a document that expressed appreciation for the challenge of this movement to the evangelical faith.

**T**HE THIRD BOOK on our list is further evidence that evangelicals cannot be neatly labeled. Emilio Núñez, a Salvadoran theologian and the author of a

book on liberation theology, and William Taylor, the son of missionaries, move in conservative evangelical circles. Read with these facts in mind, their work may come as a surprise. It has already merited them criticism from the ultraconservative wing of their own constituency because of their irenic approach to liberation the-

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### Evangelicals' emphasis on the family makes for stability and growth.

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ology and their concern for justice issues. The book is, in fact, two treatises with an introduction and a conclusion. The authors evidence a degree of difference in their perspectives, perhaps because of their different national origins.

Part one is a mildly analytical description by Taylor of the social and religious dimensions of the crisis in Latin America. Núñez devotes part two to a discussion of crucial issues that Latin American evangelicals must face. After a brief look at the "Hispano-American" religious ethos, he

deals critically and sympathetically with postconciliar Catholicism's search for renewal—liberation theology and the charismatic movement—and its resistance to change. He further addresses, theologically and historically, the growing evangelical search for gospel contextualization and the movement's gradual awakening to social responsibility.

In a concluding essay, Taylor pleads for "a complete and integrated gospel that deals with the fundamental alienation of man from God, an alienation that splinters all the relationships man sustains: those to God, to himself and to others." Within the Latin American Theological Fraternity, to which Núñez, Taylor and I belong, most members would probably agree with the substance of this book. Others could wish that the authors had been more daring in their analysis. But that is just the point. Evangelicalism spans a wide spectrum. We are united primarily by our unswerving belief in the authority and transforming power of Scripture. Despite our differences, it is this fact that makes evangelicalism a social and religious force to be reckoned with in Latin America. ■

# Surging evangelicals experience growing pains—inside and out

*Protestants in Central and South America are beginning to flex their spiritual and political muscles, but occasional cramps are still a problem.*

By Paul Pretiz

## "Holy war" in Peru

In Peru, the landslide June victory of Alberto Fujimori, a Catholic, was a test of Peru's willingness to let Fujimori's team—with 17 evangelicals—take the reins of the economically devastated country. (See PULSE, Nov. 9.) One press report called the runoff electoral campaign a "holy war" after Catholics took images of their saints into a street procession—an act usually reserved for impending disasters—as a warning against Protestant enthusiasm.

## Opposition in Mexico

A more serious confrontation occurred in February when a mob attacked a group of evangelicals praying on a hillside for Mexico City (see PULSE, March 9, June 22). The incident led to a first-ever meeting of evangelical leaders with a Mexican president, Salinas de Gortari, who was sympathetic.

Thereafter, most references to evangelicals in the media have been positive. Traditionally the Mexican press has called all Protestant groups "sects."

## Grudging recognition

David Stoll recognizes the growing evangelical presence in his recent book, *Is Latin America Turning Protestant?* (University of California Press, Berkeley) The author, not an evangelical, attempts to link the region's growing Protestant movement to the U.S. political right; but he concludes, perhaps reluctantly, that Latin America's evangelicals cannot be explained by an artificial injection of U.S. dollars.

## Harnessing missionary interest

Miami-based Latin America Mission's Christ for the City (CFC) program is harnessing the awakening missionary interest in Latin America. While incorporating long-term Costa Rican missionaries, the effort has had unexpected success using short-termers as well.

Visas for Latin Americans are sometimes as hard to get as visas for North American personnel—perhaps even harder. Work permits (for "tentmaking" ministries) and student visas may be as difficult to come by as a U.S. green card. But Costa Ricans have been more than willing to raise their own travel funds, take leave of jobs and pastorates, or sacrifice university vacations for up to a month. Says John Huffman, CFC director, "They are not a threat to a local pastor in the receiving country, who might resent a more permanently located Costa Rican opening a new church down the street."

## Source of encouragement

Pastors especially welcome other pastors, not only because of the new arrivals' ministry skills, but also because of the encouragement the locals

can get through mutual discussion and prayer in the midst of their sometimes discouraging situations. Costa Rican pastors serving in Medellín, Colombia, have inspired pastors there to start work in other Colombian cities.

Just as a short-term experience often confirms a call to missions for North Americans, these teams have encouraged many Latin Americans to consider career service. Costa Ricans have made 140 trips to Mexico and Colombia under the CFC program. Because Colombia's drug war has contributed to the exodus from Medellín of many U.S. workers, the Latin American short-termers have been especially valuable.

## Growing problem: nominalism

In the midst of occasional confrontation and violence, Latin American evangelical growth now faces a new challenge—nominalism. Research by Visión Evangélica Latinoamericana (VELA), Mexico City, suggests that the small evangelical church there may be suffering from this malady. VELA's director says the churches and denominations have reported about 250,000 evangelicals, slightly more than one percent of the metropolitan population. Government figures, however, list over two percent as "Protestant."

Part of the difference is because the government labels as Protestant groups such as the Mormons and Jehovah's Witnesses. Another reason could be that small churches simply escaped the attention of VELA's re-

searchers. A strong possibility is that a movement existing for well over a century has left in its wake some in each generation who are no longer committed to the church or Christ. But when a census-taker comes to the door, these people will never identify themselves as anything but Protestant. Studies in Costa Rica also point to more defections than expected. Paul Pretiz, a missionary in Latin America for 37 years, works in San Jose, Costa Rica.

		Evangelical Growth	
1900	50,000	Evangelicals	
1925	756,000	Evangelicals	
1936	7.2 million	Evangelicals	
1970	16 million	75,000	Churches
		60,000	Leaders without formal equipping
1989	40 million	225,000	Churches
		175,000	Leaders without formal equipping
2000	100 million	Estimate	William Taylor, executive secretary, Missions Commission, World Evangelical Fellowship


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from Patrick Johnson  
Operation World, 1986

Country	Page No.	Prayer Calendar day of month	Population in thousands	Evangelicals in thousands
Argentina	91	1-2	30,600	1,438
Bolivia	108	3-4	6,200	403
Brazil	112	5-7	138,400	22,144
Chile	135	8-9	12,000	2,592
Colombia	145	10-11	29,400	706
Costa Rica	151	12	2,600	169
Ecuador	162	13-14	9,400	301
El Salvador	166	15-16	5,500	704
Falkland Islands	172	17-18	3	—
Guatemala	200	17-18	8,403	1,597
Honduras	209	19	4,372	385
Mexico	297	20-21	80,484	2,495
Nicaragua	319	22-23	3,218	203
Panama	335	24	2,140	210
Paraguay	340	25	3,600	90
Peru	342	26-27	19,500	585
Uruguay	440	28	3,036	58

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complacent. Early converts from Catholicism said that "there are few whom they know in the Roman Catholic Church who know the facts of Christ's life and fewer still who know Christ."<sup>13</sup> Robert Speer wrote in 1913, "The very crucifixes of which South America is full misrepresent the Gospel;"<sup>14</sup> he went on to note that "even the dead Christ is the subordinate figure. The central place is Mary's."<sup>15</sup> The gospel simply was not being preached by the Catholic Church in the early part of this century, and thus Catholic claims that Latin America was Christian were invalid.

The view that Latin America is no longer in need of missionaries, or even evangelists, has been challenged by both Catholics and ecumenically minded Christians since the 1950s. At the 1953 Catholic Action Congress in Chimbote, Peru, some 300 Catholics from throughout the continent reached the conclusion that "the vast majority are only...nominal Catholics."<sup>16</sup> Likewise from the ecumenical side, Julio de Santa Ana wrote, "Latin America remains a mission field."<sup>17</sup> Not surprisingly, this conclusion has also been reached by evangelicals like Samuel Escobar, who calls Latin America "a pagan continent with a thin veneer of Christianity."<sup>18</sup> Thus there is widespread agreement today that the task of preaching the good news of Jesus Christ has not been accomplished in Latin America.

Why not then make common cause with the Roman Catholic Church to reach the continent for Christ? Why not work hand in hand to bring the gospel, instead of fighting hand to hand over issues that divide the Catholic from the Protestant Church? The answer to this type of question depends upon one's answer

to the question, "Has the Catholic Church changed for the better in Latin America since the early 1900s?" In other words, have the divisive issues that led to the Reformation and led Protestant missionaries to enter Latin America in significant numbers since the turn of the century been resolved? The evangelicals and Pentecostals have answered, "No." The abuses that gave rise to the Reformation have not been corrected, and new ones - such as the dogma of the corporal assumption of Mary, promulgated in 1950 - have been created. The literally millions of converts from Catholicism to Protestant Christianity are nearly unanimous in this verdict.

There is, however, a vocal minority of Protestants involved in the ecumenical movement in Latin America who disagree. Miguel Bonino, called by C. Rene Padilla "perhaps the most outstanding Latin American Protestant theologian today,"<sup>19</sup> wrote in 1969 that one now meets "a wholly new Catholicism, a Catholicism that is cleansed of Marian excesses, evangelized, more biblical."<sup>20</sup> The vast majority of Latin American Protestants would disagree, pointing to endemic Mariolatry, sacramentalism, papal infallibility, worship of images, prayers for the dead and to the saints, and the entire "sacrifice of the Mass" as reason enough to deny any substantial change in the Catholic Church since the Reformation. Indeed, even the immediate cause of Martin Luther's protest - the granting of indulgences from punishment in purgatory - has continued to be an integral part of the Catholic faith.<sup>21</sup>

Bonino responds to those who express their doubt that the Catholic Church has in fact changed: "People who think thus

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